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This paper presents new evidence on why unemployment insurance (UI) benefits affect search behavior
and develops a simple method of calculating the welfare gains from UI using this evidence. I show
that 60 percent of the increase in unemployment durations caused by UI benefits is due to a "liquidity
effect" rather than distortions in marginal incentives to search ("moral hazard") by combining two
empirical strategies. First, I find that increases in benefits have much larger effects on durations for
liquidity constrained households. Second, lump-sum severance payments increase durations substantially
among constrained households. I derive a formula for the optimal benefit level that depends only on
the reduced-form liquidity and moral hazard elasticities. The formula implies that the optimal UI benefit
level exceeds 50 percent of the wage. The "exact identification" approach to welfare analysis proposed








One of the classic empirical results in public ￿nance is that social insurance programs such as
unemployment insurance (UI) reduce labor supply. For example, Mo¢ tt (1985), Meyer (1990),
and others have shown that a 10% increase in unemployment bene￿ts raises average unemployment
durations by 4-8% in the U.S. This ￿nding has traditionally been interpreted as evidence of moral
hazard caused by a substitution e⁄ect: UI distorts the relative price of leisure and consumption,
reducing the marginal incentive to search for a job. For instance, Krueger and Meyer (2002, p2328)
remark that behavioral responses to UI and other social insurance programs are large because they
￿lead to short-run variation in wages with mostly a substitution e⁄ect.￿ Similarly, Gruber (2007,
p395) notes that ￿UI has a signi￿cant moral hazard cost in terms of subsidizing unproductive
leisure.￿
This paper questions whether the link between unemployment bene￿ts and durations is purely
due to moral hazard. The analysis is motivated by evidence that many unemployed individuals
have limited liquidity and exhibit excess sensitivity of consumption to cash-on-hand (Gruber 1997,
Browning and Crossley 2001, Bloemen and Stancanelli 2005). Indeed, nearly half of job losers in
the United States report zero liquid wealth at the time of job loss, suggesting that many households
may be unable to smooth transitory income shocks relative to permanent income.
Using a job search model with incomplete credit and insurance markets, I show that when
an individual cannot smooth consumption perfectly, unemployment bene￿ts a⁄ect search intensity
through a ￿liquidity e⁄ect￿in addition to the moral hazard channel emphasized in earlier work.
Intuitively, UI bene￿ts increase cash-on-hand and consumption while unemployed for an agent who
cannot smooth perfectly. Such an agent faces less pressure to ￿nd a new job quickly, leading to
a longer duration. Hence, unemployment bene￿ts raise durations purely through moral hazard
when consumption can be smoothed perfectly, but through both liquidity and moral hazard e⁄ects
when smoothing is imperfect.1
The distinction between liquidity and moral hazard is of interest because the two e⁄ects have
divergent implications for the welfare consequences of UI. The substitution e⁄ect is a socially
suboptimal response to the creation of a wedge between private and social marginal costs. In
contrast, the liquidity e⁄ect is a socially bene￿cial response to the correction of the credit and
1I use the term ￿liquidity e⁄ect￿to refer to the e⁄ect of a wealth grant while unemployed. The liquidity e⁄ect di⁄ers
from the wealth e⁄ect (i.e., an increase permanent income) if the agent cannot smooth consumption perfectly. Indeed,
there are models where the wealth e⁄ect is zero but the liquidity e⁄ect is positive because of liquidity constraints (see
e.g. Shimer and Werning 2007).
1insurance market failures. Building on this logic, I develop a new formula for the optimal unem-
ployment bene￿t level that depends purely on the liquidity and moral hazard e⁄ects. The formula
uses revealed preference to calculate the welfare gain from insurance: if an agent chooses a longer
duration primarily because he has more cash-on-hand (as opposed to distorted incentives), we infer
that UI bene￿ts bring the agent closer to the social optimum.
The approach to welfare analysis proposed in this paper is very di⁄erent from the traditional
approach of structurally estimating a model￿ s primitives (curvature of utility, borrowing limit,
etc.) and then numerically simulating the e⁄ects of policy changes. I instead identify a pair of
reduced-form elasticities that serve as su¢ cient statistics for welfare analysis. Conditional on these
elasticities, the primitives do not need to be identi￿ed because any combination of primitives that
matches the elasticities leads to the same welfare results. In this sense, the structural approach is
￿over-identi￿ed￿for the purpose of welfare analysis, whereas the method proposed here is ￿exactly
identi￿ed.￿ In addition to simplicity, the exact identi￿cation approach has two advantages. First,
it is less model dependent. While previous studies of unemployment insurance have had to make
stark assumptions about borrowing constraints and the lack of private insurance (e.g. Wolpin 1987;
Hansen and Imrohoglu 1992), the formula here requires no such assumptions. Second, it is likely to
be more empirically credible. Since one has to identify two parameters rather than a large number
of primitives, it is feasible to estimate the relevant elasticities using quasi-experimental variation
and relatively few parametric assumptions.2
I implement this method empirically by estimating the importance of moral hazard vs. liquidity
in UI using two complementary strategies. I ￿rst estimate the e⁄ect of unemployment bene￿ts on
durations separately for liquidity constrained and unconstrained households, exploiting di⁄erential
changes in bene￿t levels across states in the U.S. Since households￿ability to smooth consumption
is unobserved, I proxy for it using three measures: asset holdings, single vs. dual-earner status, and
an indicator for having to make a mortgage payment. I ￿nd that a 10% increase in UI bene￿ts
raises unemployment durations by 7-10% in the constrained groups. In contrast, changes in UI
bene￿ts have much smaller e⁄ects on durations in the unconstrained groups, indicating that the
moral hazard e⁄ect is relatively small among these groups. These results suggest that liquidity
e⁄ects could be quite important in the bene￿ts-duration link. However, they do not directly
establish that bene￿ts raise the durations of constrained agents by increasing liquidity unless one
2The disadvantage of exact identi￿cation is that the scope of questions for which it can be used is limited. See
section 2.5 for a detailed comparison of the two approaches.
2assumes that the substitution elasticities are similar across constrained and unconstrained groups.
To avoid identi￿cation from cross-sectional comparisons between di⁄erent types of job losers,
I pursue a second empirical strategy to estimate the magnitude of the liquidity e⁄ect. I exploit
variation across job losers in the receipt of lump-sum severance payments, which provide liquidity
but have no moral hazard e⁄ect. Using a survey of job losers from Mathematica containing
information on severance pay, I ￿nd that individuals who received severance pay (worth about
$4000 on average) have substantially longer durations. An obvious concern is that this ￿nding
may re￿ ect correlation rather than causality because severance pay is not randomly assigned. Three
pieces of evidence support the causality of severance pay. First, severance payments have a large
e⁄ect on durations among constrained (low asset) households, but have no e⁄ect on durations among
unconstrained households. Second, the estimated e⁄ect of severance pay is not a⁄ected by controls
for demographics, income, job tenure, industry, and occupation in a Cox hazard model. Third,
individuals who receive larger severance amounts have longer unemployment durations. These
￿ndings, though not conclusive given the lack of randomized variation in cash grants, suggest that
UI has a substantial liquidity e⁄ect.
Combining the point estimates from the two empirical approaches, I ￿nd that roughly 60% of the
marginal e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on durations is due to the liquidity e⁄ect. Coupled with the formula
derived from the search model, this estimate implies that the marginal welfare gain of increasing
the unemployment bene￿t level from the prevailing rate of 50% of the pre-unemployment wage is
small but positive. Hence, the optimal bene￿t level exceeds 50% of the wage in the existing UI
system that pays constant bene￿ts for six months. An important caveat to this policy conclusion
is that it does not consider other types of policy instruments to resolve credit and insurance market
failures. A natural alternative tool to resolve credit market failures is the provision of loans. I
brie￿ y compare the potential value of loans vs. UI bene￿ts using numerical simulations at the end
of the paper.
In addition to the empirical literature on unemployment insurance, this paper relates to and
builds on several other strands of the literature in macroeconomics and public ￿nance. First,
several studies have used consumption data to investigate the importance of liquidity constraints
and partial insurance (see e.g., Zeldes 1989; Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 2006; Blundell, Pistaferri,
and Preston 2008). This paper presents analogous evidence from the labor market, showing that
labor supply is ￿excessively sensitive￿to transitory income because of imperfections in credit and
insurance markets. Second, several studies have explored the e⁄ects of incomplete insurance and
3credit markets for job search behavior and UI using simulations of calibrated search models (Hansen
and Imrohoglu 1992; Acemoglu and Shimer 2000). The analysis here can be viewed as the empirical
counterpart of such studies, in which the extent to which agents can smooth shocks is estimated
empirically rather than simulated from a calibrated model.
The distinction between moral hazard and liquidity e⁄ects arises in any private or social insur-
ance program, and could be used to calculate the value of insuring other shocks such as health or
disability. More generally, it may be possible to develop similar exact identi￿cation strategies to
characterize the welfare consequences of other government policies beyond social insurance.
The paper proceeds as follows. The search model and formula for optimal bene￿ts are presented
in the next section. Section 3 discusses the evidence on heterogeneous e⁄ects of unemployment
bene￿ts on durations. Section 4 examines the e⁄ect of severance payments on durations. The
estimates are used to calibrate the formula for welfare gains in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theory
I analyze a job search model closely related to the models in Chetty (2003), Lentz and Tranaes
(2005), and Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007). The model features (partial) failures in credit and
insurance markets, creating a potential role for government intervention via an insurance program.
I ￿rst distinguish the moral hazard and liquidity e⁄ects of UI and then derive a formula for the
welfare gain from UI in terms of these elasticities.
2.1 Agent and Planner￿ s Problems
Agent￿ s Problem. Consider a discrete-time setting where the agent lives for T periods f0;:::;T ￿1g.
Assume that the interest rate and the agent￿ s time discount rate are zero. Suppose the agent
becomes unemployed at t = 0. An agent who enters a period t without a job ￿rst chooses search
intensity st. Normalize st to equal the probability of ￿nding a job in the current period. Let  (st)
denote the cost of search e⁄ort, which is strictly increasing and convex. If search is successful, the
agent begins working immediately in period t.3 Assume that all jobs last inde￿nitely once found.
I make three assumptions to simplify the exposition in the baseline case: (1) the agent earns
a ￿xed pre-tax wage of wt if employed in period t, eliminating reservation-wage choices; (2) assets
3A more conventional timing assumption in search models without savings is that search in period t leads to a job
that begins in period t + 1. Assuming that search in period t leads to a job in period t itself simpli￿es the analytic
expressions for
@st
@At, as shown by Lentz and Tranaes (2005).
4prior to job loss (A0) are exogenous, eliminating e⁄ects of UI bene￿ts on savings behavior prior to
job loss; and (3) no heterogeneity across agents. These assumptions are relaxed in the extensions
analyzed in section 2.4.
If the worker is unemployed in period t, he receives an unemployment bene￿t bt < wt. If the
worker is employed in period t, he pays a tax ￿ that is used to ￿nance the unemployment bene￿t.
Let ce
t denote the agent￿ s consumption in period t if a job is found in that period. If the agent fails
to ￿nd a job in period t, he sets consumption to cu
t . The agent then enters period t+1 unemployed
and the problem repeats.
Let v(ct) denote ￿ ow consumption utility if employed in period t and u(ct) denote ￿ ow con-
sumption utility if unemployed. Assume that u and v are strictly concave. Note that this utility
speci￿cation permits arbitrary complementarities between consumption and labor.
Search Behavior. The value function for an individual who ￿nds a job at the beginning of period
t, conditional on beginning the period with assets At is
Vt(At) = max
At+1￿L
v(At ￿ At+1 + wt ￿ ￿) + Vt+1(At+1). (1)
where L is a lower bound on assets. The value function for an individual who fails to ￿nd a job at
the beginning of period t and remains unemployed is
Ut(At) = max
At+1￿L




stVt(At) + (1 ￿ st)Ut(At) ￿  (st) (3)
is the value of entering period t without a job with assets At. It is easy to show that Vt is
concave because there is no uncertainty following re-employment; however, Ut could be convex. In
simulations of the model with plausible parameters (described below), non-concavity never arises.4
Therefore, I simply assume that Ut is concave in the parameter space of interest.
An unemployed agent chooses st to maximize expected utility at the beginning of period t,
given by (3). Optimal search intensity is determined by the ￿rst-order condition
 0(st) = Vt(At) ￿ Ut(At). (4)
4Lentz and Tranaes (2005) also report that non-concavity never arises in their simulations. They also show that
any non-concavities in Ut can be eliminated by introducing a wealth lottery prior to the choice of st.
5Intuitively, st is chosen to equate the marginal cost of search e⁄ort with its marginal value, which
is given by the di⁄erence between the optimized values of employment and unemployment.
Planner￿ s Problem. The social planner￿ s objective is to choose the unemployment bene￿t
system that maximizes the agent￿ s expected utility. He could in principle set a di⁄erent bene￿t
level bt in each period. In this paper, I restrict attention to the ￿constant bene￿t, ￿nite duration￿
class of policies ￿policies that pay a constant level of bene￿ts b for B periods: bt = b for t ￿ B ￿1;
bt = 0 for t > B ￿ 1. In practice, most UI bene￿t policies lie within the constant bene￿t, ￿nite
duration class; for example, B = 26 weeks in the U.S. The problem I analyze here is the optimal











(1 ￿ sj) denote the agent￿ s expected compensated duration, i.e. the expected number of
weeks for which he receives unemployment bene￿ts. The planner￿ s problem is to choose the UI
bene￿t level b and tax rate ￿ that maximize the agent￿ s expected utility such that expected bene￿ts
paid (DBb) equal expected taxes collected ((T ￿ D)￿):
max
b;￿
J0(b;￿) s.t. DBb = (T ￿ D)￿ (5)
I solve this problem in two steps, the ￿rst positive and the second normative. I ￿rst show that
the e⁄ect of unemployment bene￿ts can be decomposed into liquidity and moral hazard e⁄ects. I
then use this decomposition to derive a formula for the optimal bene￿t level b￿.5
2.2 Moral Hazard and Liquidity E⁄ects
To understand the channels through which UI bene￿ts a⁄ect search behavior, ￿rst consider the
e⁄ect of a $1 increase in the bene￿t level bt on search intensity in period t:
@st=@bt = ￿u0(cu
t )= 00(st)
Next, consider the e⁄ects of a $1 increase in assets At and a $1 increase in the period t wage wt:
@st=@At = fv0(ce
t) ￿ u0(cu
t )g= 00(st) ￿ 0 (6)
@st=@wt = v0(ce
t)= 00(st) > 0 (7)
5In the baseline welfare analysis, I take the initial asset level A0 as exogenous. I then analyze an extension that
allows A0 to be endogenously determined by b, and also allows for endogenous private insurance.
6The e⁄ect of a cash grant on search intensity depends on the di⁄erence in marginal utilities between
employed and unemployed states. This is because an increase in cash on hand lowers the marginal
return to search to the extent that it raises the value of being unemployed relative to being employed.
The e⁄ect of an increase in wt is proportional to v0(ce
t) because a higher wage increases the marginal
return to search to the extent that it raises the value of being employed. Combining (6) and (7)
yields the decomposition
@st=@bt = @st=@At ￿ @st=@wt. (8)
Equation (8) shows that an increase in the unemployment bene￿t level lowers search intensity
through two conceptually distinct channels. The ￿rst channel is the liquidity e⁄ect (@st=@At): a
higher bene￿t increases the agent￿ s cash-on-hand, allowing the agent to maintain a higher level of
consumption while unemployed and reducing the pressure to ￿nd a new job quickly. The second
channel is the moral hazard e⁄ect (￿@st=@wt): a higher bene￿t e⁄ectively lowers the agent￿ s net
wage (wt ￿ ￿ ￿ bt), reducing the incentive to search though a substitution e⁄ect.6
The decomposition above applies to a one-period increase in the UI bene￿t level. In practice,
UI bene￿t levels are typically changed over multiple weeks simultaneously. For instance, if a
bene￿t of $b is paid for the ￿rst B weeks of the spell, as in equation (5), an increase in b a⁄ects
income in the unemployed state in all periods t ￿ B ￿ 1. In this case, the liquidity e⁄ect cannot
be exactly identi￿ed by comparing the e⁄ect of a lump-sum cash grant in period 0 to the e⁄ect of
an increase in b because the timing of receipt of income may matter when agents cannot smooth
consumption. Conceptually, this problem can be resolved by introducing an annuity that pays the
agent $at regardless of employment status in each period t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1. Using this annuity, it is















@at) is the e⁄ect of increasing the annuity payment by $1
in the ￿rst B weeks of the spell, and the moral hazard e⁄ect (￿@s0




@wt) is the e⁄ect of
reducing the wage rate over the ￿rst B weeks.
6Technically, @st=@wt itself includes a income e⁄ect because an increase in the wage rate raises permanent income.
Since UI bene￿ts have little impact on total lifetime wealth, this permanent income e⁄ect is negligible in this context
and @st=@wt re￿ ects essentially a pure substitution e⁄ect. The decomposition in (8) can therefore be interpreted a
search-model analog of the Slutsky decomposition. The substitution e⁄ect reduces the welfare gain from UI, much
as a distortionary tax creates a deadweight burden proportional to the substitution e⁄ect.
7Empirical Implications: Heterogeneous Responses. The prevailing view in the existing literature
is that individuals take longer to ￿nd a job when receiving higher UI bene￿ts solely because of the
lower private return to work. This pure moral hazard interpretation is valid only for an agent who




for all t, the liquidity e⁄ect @s0
@a jB = 0 because an annuity payment raises Vt(At) and Ut(At) by the
same amount.7 At the other extreme, a hand-to-mouth consumer who sets consumption equal to
income has v0(ce
t) ￿ u0(cu
t ) < 0. Since this agent experiences large ￿ uctuations in marginal utility
across states, the magnitude of @s0
@a jB can be large for him.
More generally, between the hand-to-mouth and perfect-smoothing extremes, individuals who
have less ability to smooth will exhibit larger liquidity and total UI bene￿t e⁄ects holding all else
constant. To illustrate this heterogeneity, I numerically simulate the search model for agents with
di⁄erent levels of initial assets. I parametrize the search model using CRRA utility (u(c) = v(c) =
c1￿￿
1￿￿ ) and a convex disutility of search e⁄ort ( (s) = ￿s1+￿
1+￿ ).8 I set ￿ = 1:75, ￿ = 0:1, ￿ = 5, and
w = $340 per week. The asset limit is L = ￿$1000 and T = 500 (10 years). The UI bene￿t
bt = b is constant for B = 26 weeks. Finally, assume that the agent receives a baseline annuity
payment of at = 0:25w = $85 in each period, which can be interpreted as the income of a secondary
earner. At the median initial asset level of $100 and weekly UI bene￿t level of b = 0:5w = 170, this
combination of parameters is roughly consistent with the three key empirical moments used in the
welfare calculation in section 5: the average UI-compensated unemployment duration (data: 15.8
weeks, simulation: 15.8 weeks), the ratio of the liquidity e⁄ect to the moral hazard e⁄ect (data:
1.50, simulation: 1.35), and the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the bene￿t
level (data: 0.54, simulation: 0.36).
The solid curves in Figure 1 plot search intensity in period 0 (s0) vs. the UI bene￿t level b for
agents with A0 = ￿$1;000 and A0 = $13;000, the 25th and 75th percentiles of the initial asset
distribution of the job losers observed in the data. As predicted, the e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on search
intensity falls with assets: raising the wage replacement rate from b = 0:05w to the actual rate of
b = 0:5w reduces search intensity by approximately 55% for the low-asset group compared to 22%
for the high-asset group. The reason for the di⁄erence in the bene￿t e⁄ects is that the liquidity
e⁄ect is much larger for the low-asset agent. To see this, let a denote the increment in the annuity
7Intertemporal smoothing itself cannot completely eliminate ￿ uctuations in marginal utility across the employed
and unemployed states because unemployment a⁄ects lifetime wealth. Hence, v
0(c
e




insurance markets are complete.
8To eliminate degeneracies in the simulation, I cap the probability of ￿nding a job in any given period at 0:25 by
assuming  (s) = 1 for s > 0:25.
8payment when t ￿ 25, so that at = 0:25w + a for t ￿ 25 and at = 0:25w for t > 25. The dashed
curves in Figure 1 plot s0 vs. a, holding the UI bene￿t b ￿xed at 0. Increasing the annuity payment
from a = 0:05w to a = 0:5w reduces search intensity by 45% for the low-asset group, compared to
7% for the high-asset group. The liquidity e⁄ect thus accounts for the majority of the UI bene￿t
e⁄ect for the low-asset agent, whereas moral hazard accounts for the majority of the bene￿t e⁄ect
for the high-asset agent.
The liquidity e⁄ects are large for agents with low A0 because they reduce cu
t quite sharply early
in the spell, either because of binding borrowing constraints or as a precaution against a protracted
spell of joblessness (as in Carroll 1997). Once agents have a moderate bu⁄er stock of assets (e.g.
A0 > $10;000) to smooth temporary income ￿ uctuations, liquidity e⁄ects become negligible even
though insurance markets are incomplete. Intuitively, intertemporal smoothing is su¢ cient to
make the gap in marginal utilities v0(ce
t) ￿ u0(cu
t ) quite small because unemployment shocks are
small on average relative to lifetime wealth.9
In this numerical example, the heterogeneity in liquidity e⁄ects translates directly into het-
erogeneity in total responses to UI bene￿ts because the moral hazard e⁄ect @s0
@w jB happens to be
similar across the two agents. In general, however, @s0
@w jB may not be similar across agents with
di⁄erent asset levels. This motivates a two-pronged approach to identifying the relative importance
of liquidity vs. moral hazard e⁄ects: (1) estimate how the e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on search behavior
varies across liquidity constrained vs. unconstrained individuals and (2) estimate how the e⁄ect
of annuity payments or lump-sum cash grants on search behavior varies across the same groups.
Combining estimates from these two approaches, one can calculate the fraction of the UI-duration
link due to liquidity vs. moral hazard. Before turning to this empirical analysis, I show why this
decomposition is of interest from a normative perspective.
2.3 Welfare Analysis: Optimal Unemployment Bene￿ts
Static Case. To simplify the exposition, I begin by characterizing the welfare gain from UI for a
static search model (T = 1). In this case, the social planner￿ s problem in (5) simpli￿es to:
max
b0
f W(b0) = (1 ￿ s0(b0))u(A0 + b0) + s0(b0)v(A0 + w0 ￿ ￿) ￿  (s0(b0))
s.t. b0(1 ￿ s0(b0)) = s0(b0)￿
9For shocks that have large e⁄ects on lifetime wealth (e.g. health, disability), the ￿liquidity￿(non-moral-hazard)
e⁄ect of insurance could be large even for agents who are not liquidity constrained.
9The welfare gain from increasing b0 by $1 is
df W
db0










db0, it follows that
df W
db0









To obtain a money metric for the welfare gain, I follow Lucas (1987) and de￿ne dW
db0 as the ratio of
the welfare gain from raising bene￿ts to the welfare gain of increasing the wage rate by $1. The
marginal welfare gain dW
db0 can be expressed as a simple function of the gap in the marginal utilities




















where "1￿s;b = b0
1￿s0
d(1￿s0)
db0 is the elasticity of the probability of being unemployed with respect to













This formula shows that the welfare gain from increasing b can be calculated purely using estimates
of the liquidity and moral hazard e⁄ects. Since all the inputs in (11) are endogenous to b0, the
value of dW
db0 applies only locally. Given concavity of W(b0), b￿
0 satis￿es dW
db0 (b￿
0) = 0. Hence, (11)
provides a test for whether the bene￿t level at which the elasticities are estimated is optimal. The
sign of dW
db0 indicates whether the optimal bene￿t level is above or below the current level.
An interesting implication of (11) is that an analyst who assumes away liquidity e⁄ects can
immediately conclude that UI strictly reduces welfare ( @s0
@A0 = 0 ) dW
db0
< 0), because he has
e⁄ectively assumed that markets are complete. The optimal unemployment insurance problem
warrants analysis only when there are liquidity e⁄ects. I provide intuition for this result and the
formula in (11) after generalizing it to T > 1.
Dynamic Case. Now consider the general problem in (5), where UI bene￿ts are paid at a
constant level b for B ￿ T periods. As above, one can construct a money-metric for the welfare
gain from UI by comparing the e⁄ect of a $1 increase in b with a $1 increase in the wage rate w






dwt. Let ￿ = T￿D
T denote the fraction of his life
the agent is employed. Let "DB;b = b
DB
dDB
db and "D;b = b
D
dD
db denote the total elasticities of the
UI-compensated and total unemployment duration with respect to the UI bene￿t level, taking into
account the e⁄ect of the increase in ￿ needed to ￿nance the increase in b.
When T > 1, the e⁄ects of bene￿t and tax increases on welfare depend on the entire path of
marginal utilities after re-employment. In addition, when B < T, dW
db depends on both DB and
D. These factors make the formula for dW
db more complex, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose UI bene￿ts are paid for B periods at a level b. The welfare gain from






























t) denotes the average marginal
utility of consumption after re-employment conditional on ￿nding a job before period s.
Proof. The general logic of the proof is to write the welfare gain in terms of marginal utilities,
as in (10), and then relate these marginal utilities to the moral hazard and liquidity comparative
statics. See Appendix A for details.
The formula for dW
db when T ￿ B > 1 di⁄ers from the formula in (11) for the static case in three
respects. First, the welfare gain depends on a new parameter ￿ in addition to the liquidity and
moral hazard e⁄ects. The parameter ￿ is an increasing function of the sensitivity of consumption
upon re-employment to the length of the preceding unemployment spell, i.e. the rate at which v0(ce
t)
rises with t. The ￿ term enters the formula because part of the liquidity e⁄ect arises from the
di⁄erence in expected marginal utilities after re-employment at di⁄erent dates when T > 1. This
component of the liquidity e⁄ect has to be subtracted out, because only the di⁄erence in marginal
utilities between the employed and unemployed states matters for optimal UI.
Second, when B < T, dW
db depends on a weighted average of "D;b and "DB;b because d￿
db is
determined by both the time the agent spends on the UI system and the time he spends working
and paying taxes. Third, the welfare gain is scaled down by DB
D < 1 because UI bene￿ts are paid
for only a fraction DB
D of the unemployment spell, reducing the welfare gain from raising b relative
to the welfare gain of a permanent wage increase.
11Approximate Formula. There are two complications in connecting the empirical estimates below
to the inputs called for in (12). First, the empirical analysis does not yield an estimate of ￿. Second,
the liquidity e⁄ect @s0
@a jB depends on the e⁄ect of a $1 increase in an annuity payment, but the only
variation in the data is in lump-sum severance payments ￿that is, variation in A0.
To address the ￿rst issue, I use the approximation that the consumption path upon re-employment
is ￿ at, i.e. that ce
t does not vary with t. This is an intuitive assumption because consumption re-
verts to the present value of lifetime wealth upon re-employment, and unemployment spells typically
have negligible e⁄ects on subsequent lifetime wealth. The ￿ at consumption path approximation
implies ￿ = 0.
To calculate the liquidity e⁄ect, I translate the e⁄ect of a lump-sum grant ( @s0
@A0) into the e⁄ect
of a B-period annuity (@s0
@a jB). When the maximum duration of bene￿ts B is relatively short, as in
the U.S., it is plausible to assume that the borrowing constraint is slack in weeks 0 to B￿1. This is
because the agent maintains a bu⁄er stock in case his spell extends beyond the B weeks (as veri￿ed
by the simulations below). Hence, a $1 annuity payment over the ￿rst B weeks is equivalent to
a $B cash grant in period 0, since the Euler equation holds and the agent can exchange money
freely across weeks. Even if the borrowing constraint does bind at some point before week B, the








To further simplify the formula, I assume that "D;b = "DB;b.10 Using these approximations, it
follows immediately that (12) reduces to a simple function of the e⁄ects of lump-sum grants and
bene￿t increases on search intensity at the beginning of the spell.
Corollary 1. Under the approximations that (i) ce
t does not vary with t, (ii) "D;b = "DB;b, and































10This approximation is supported empirically: the elasticity estimates in section 4, which measure ￿duration￿as
time between jobs, are similar to those in studies that measure duration as time on the UI system (e.g. Meyer 1990).
12Quality of Approximations. How accurate of an approximation does (14) provide for the actual
welfare gain? I answer this question by comparing the actual (numerically calculated) and approx-
imate welfare gains from raising the bene￿t level using simulations with the same parametrization
as in section 2.2 and A0 = 100. I compute the actual welfare gain by calculating J0(b;w) numer-
ically and de￿ning @W
@b =
J0(b+1)￿J0(b)
J0(w+1)￿J0(w). I compute the approximate welfare gain by calculating
@s0=@A0, @s0=@b, and "DB;b numerically and applying the formula in Corollary 1.
Figure 2 plots the actual and approximate values of dW
db as a function of the wage replacement
rate b
w. The ￿gure shows, for instance, that the welfare gain of raising the UI bene￿t level by $1
starting from a replacement rate of 50% is equivalent to a permanent 3.5 cent wage increase. The
welfare gain falls with b because J0 is concave in b ￿there are diminishing returns to correcting
market failures. The approximate welfare gain is very similar to the actual welfare gain, with
an average deviation of 0.2 cents over the range plotted. At all but the lowest replacement rates
( b
w < 15%), the approximate and actual measures are indistinguishable. The similarity is striking
given how much less information is used to implement the approximate formula than the actual
(￿structural approach￿ ) measure.
The approximation works well for two reasons. First, the consumption path upon re-employment
fce
tg is quite ￿ at; for example, when b = 0:5w, ce
0 = $423:50 and ce
26 = $423:46. As a result, ￿ is
close to 0 (￿ = ￿0:002).11 Second, the borrowing constraint is slack for t < 26 when b
w > 15%.
Since bene￿ts are provided for only 26 weeks, the agent retains a bu⁄er stock to insure against the
risk of a spell beyond 26 weeks. For instance, when b = 0:5, the agent enters week 26 with $75 in
assets if he is still unemployed at that time, even though he could have borrowed up to $1000. The
annuity to cash grant conversion in (13) therefore holds exactly for b > 0:15w. When b < 0:15w,
the borrowing constraint starts to bind in the fourth or ￿fth month, leading to a modest error in
the annuity conversion because most spells end before this point.12
The welfare gain remains positive even at b = 0:95w because of the stylized nature of the
simulation. Allowing for private-market or informal insurance mechanisms would substantially
reduce the simulated welfare gains, particularly at high bene￿t levels. This sensitivity to modelling
assumptions is precisely the advantage of using the elasticity-based formula in (14) rather than
simulating the welfare gains from the structural model, as I discuss below.
11In this numerical example, fc
e
tg is particularly ￿ at because the agent does not borrow against future earnings
while unemployed prior to week B = 26 because of the risk that the spell may extend beyond the UI exhaustion date.
In the appendix, I give a bounding argument showing that ￿ < 0:015 irrespective of the agent￿ s borrowing decisions.
12If
@s0
@a jB were empirically estimable, the approximate measure would remain equally accurate for
b
w < 15%.
Hence, the only potentially non-trivial source of approximation error is the annuity conversion in (13).
132.4 Extensions
Endogenous Ex-Ante Behavior. The preceding welfare analysis assumed that behavior prior to
job loss is invariant to the unemployment bene￿t level. In practice, higher bene￿ts might reduce
precautionary saving and private market insurance arrangements. To understand how such ex-ante
behavioral responses a⁄ect Corollary 1, suppose the agent is employed at wage w￿1 ￿ ￿ in period
t = ￿1. He faces a (￿xed) probability p of being laid o⁄ in period 0, at which point the problem
speci￿ed in section 2.1 begins. With probability 1 ￿ p, the agent is granted tenure and remains
employed until T. The agent can purchase an insurance policy that pays $z if he is laid o⁄ and
charges a premium !(z) if he remains employed.13 The agent￿ s value function in period ￿1 is:
J￿1(A￿1) = max
A0;z




The social planner￿ s problem is to
max
b;￿
J￿1(b;￿) s.t. pDBb = (T + 1 ￿ pD)￿ (16)







dwt and the fraction of time employed as ￿ =
T+1￿pD
T+1 . In
Appendix A, I show that Corollary 1 remains valid in this extended model subject to one caveat:
the derivatives @s0
@a jB and @s0
@b must be evaluated holding the ex-ante choices of A0 and z ￿xed.14
Intuitively, endogenous ex-ante behaviors have no e⁄ect on the marginal utility representation in
(10) because of envelope conditions that eliminate ￿rst-order e⁄ects of these behavioral responses.
The liquidity and moral hazard comparative statics, however, are confounded by changes in ex-
ante behavior, breaking the link between the ratio R and the gap in marginal utilities between
the employed and unemployed states. Conditioning on A0 and z when calculating the derivatives
restores the link between @s0
@a jB=@s0
@b and the gap in marginal utilities.
Thus, (14) holds with endogenous ex-ante behavior, but the variation used to estimate the
liquidity and moral hazard e⁄ects must be chosen judiciously. In the empirical application below,
@s0
@b is estimated from unanticipated changes in bene￿t rules, making it plausible that ex-ante
13There is still a potential role for government-provided insurance in this model because private insurance may
have a load (!(z) >
p
1￿pz). Note that the private insurance policy considered here does not induce moral hazard
because it does not a⁄ect the marginal incentive to search. Allowing for private insurance policies that induce moral
hazard requires a modi￿cation of the formula because of a ￿scal externality problem. See Chetty and Saez (2008)
for an extension of the formula in (14) to this case.
14If
@s0
@a jB is estimated using variation in severance payments and the annuity conversion in (13), the e⁄ect of
severance pay on durations must be estimated holding savings behavior prior to job loss ￿xed.
14behaviors are una⁄ected by the variation in b. In other contexts, such as cross-sectional comparisons
of unemployment durations across states or countries, ex-ante behavioral responses may a⁄ect the
elasticities.
Stochastic Wage O⁄ers. How does allowing for uncertainty in the wage o⁄er a⁄ect the formula
for dW
db ? Consider a model in which search intensity st controls the arrival rate of wage o⁄ers,
which are drawn from a distribution F(w). In this environment, the agent chooses both st and
a reservation wage Rt below which he rejects job o⁄ers (McCall 1970). The formula in Corollary
1 still applies in this environment (see Appendix A). The logic for why the result generalizes can
be seen in three steps. First, the envelope conditions used to write dW
db in terms of expected
marginal utilities still hold because Rt is simply another optimized variable. Second, the ￿rst-
order-condition for search intensity in (4) applies irrespective of the wage distribution, allowing us
to relate the expected marginal utilities to the comparative statics of search intensity as above.
Finally, using the approximation that the mean level of consumption upon re-employment is ￿ at
over time (analogous to the ￿ = 0 approximation above), one obtains (14).
Although the formula for dW
db has the same form, more information is required to implement it
empirically when wage o⁄ers are stochastic. Changes in empirically observed job ￿nding hazards
cannot be directly used to infer the relevant changes in search intensity (@s0
@a ; @s0
@b ) because part
of the change in job ￿nding hazards comes from changes in the reservation wage. In Appendix
A, I show that (14) can be implemented when wages are stochastic using data on mean accepted
wages. The change in the mean accepted wage can be used to infer how much of a change in job
￿nding rates is due to changes in search intensity vs. the reservation wage. Intuitively, the e⁄ect
of UI bene￿ts on the reservation wage will be manifested in changes in ex-post accepted wages.
Recent evidence indicates that UI bene￿t levels have little e⁄ect on wages and other measures of
the accepted job￿ s quality (Card, Chetty, Weber 2007; van Ours and Vodopivec 2008). In light of
this evidence, the empirical implementation of (14) in section 5 ￿in which changes in hazard rates
are equated with changes in st ￿is valid even with stochastic wage o⁄ers.15
Heterogeneity. The empirical analysis below reveals considerable heterogeneity in liquidity and
UI bene￿t e⁄ects. How does such heterogeneity a⁄ect the calculation of dW
db if the government sets
a single bene￿t level as above? Consider a model in which agents have heterogeneous preferences
15Aside from its implications for the link between search intensity and hazard rates, the evidence on match quality
e⁄ects has no bearing on the optimal bene￿t level under the revealed-preference test proposed here. It does not




@b , evidence on search outcomes matters for welfare analysis only if the preferences revealed by choice are
not those that the social planner wishes to maximize (e.g. because of time-inconsistency).
15and asset levels and the government has a utilitarian social welfare function. De￿ne dW
db as the
aggregate marginal welfare gain from raising b relative to raising the wage rate for all agents. Then
dW
db has the same representation as in (10), replacing the marginal utilities by average marginal
utilities across agents (see Appendix A). However, connecting the gap in average marginal utilities








assumptions. This is because agents with high values of  00(s0) receive less weight in both the
mean liquidity and moral hazard e⁄ects since their behavior is less elastic to policy changes. But
all agents receive equal weight in the welfare calculation under the utilitarian criterion. If the
heterogeneity in marginal utilities (v0(ce
t); u0(ce
t)) is orthogonal to the heterogeneity in  00(s0) ￿that
is, if the parameters which control heterogeneity in preferences over consumption and disutility of
search are independently distributed ￿the  00(s0) terms cancel out of R. Under this independence
assumption, the formula for dW
db in Corollary 1 measures the mean per-capita welfare gain of raising
b when calibrated using mean e⁄ects as in section 5.
2.5 Discussion
Intuition for the Test. The analysis above has shown that the optimal bene￿t level does not
necessarily fall with "D;b, contrary to conventional wisdom. It matters whether a higher value of
"D;b comes from a larger liquidity (￿@s0
@a jB) or moral hazard (@s0
@w jB) component. To the extent
that it is the liquidity e⁄ect, UI reduces the need for agents to rush back to work because they
have insu¢ cient ability to smooth consumption; if it is primarily the moral hazard e⁄ect, UI is
subsidizing unproductive leisure. In this sense, the formula for optimal UI proposed here can be
interpreted as a new method of quantifying the extent to which the full insurance benchmark is
violated. The agent￿ s capacity to smooth marginal utilities is assessed by examining the e⁄ect
of transitory income shocks on the consumption of leisure instead of goods as in earlier studies
(Cochrane 1991, Gruber 1997).
More generally, the concept underlying (14) is to measure the value of insurance using revealed
preference. The e⁄ect of a lump-sum cash grant on the unemployment duration reveals the extent
to which the UI bene￿t permits the agent to attain a more socially desirable allocation. If a
lump-sum grant has no e⁄ect on the duration of search, we infer that the agent is taking more time
to ￿nd a job when the UI bene￿t level is increased purely because of the price subsidy for doing so.
In this case, UI simply creates ine¢ ciency by taxing work, and dW
db < 0. In contrast, if the agent
raises his duration substantially even when he receives a non-distortionary cash grant, we infer that
16the UI bene￿t permits him to make a more (socially) optimal choice, i.e. the choice he would make
if the credit and insurance market failures could be alleviated without distorting incentives. The
test thus identi￿es the policy that is best from the libertarian criterion of correcting market failures
as revealed by individual choice.
Comparison to Alternative Methods. The most widely used existing method of policy analysis is
the structural approach, which involves two steps: ￿rst, estimate the primitives using a parametrized
model of behavior ￿e.g. the curvature of the utility function, the cost of search e⁄ort, the borrowing
limit, etc. Second, simulate the e⁄ect of policy changes using the estimated model, as in the
calculation of the actual welfare gain in Figure 2. Wolpin (1987) pioneered the application of this
approach to job search; more recent examples include Hansen and Imrohoglu (1992), Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (1997), and Lentz (2008).
In contrast with the structural approach, the formula in Corollary 1 leaves the primitives uniden-
ti￿ed. It instead identi￿es a set of high-level moments ("DB;b, R, DB) that are su¢ cient statistics
for the marginal value of insurance (up to the approximations necessitated by data limitations).
The primitives do not need to be identi￿ed because any combination of primitives that matches
("DB;b, R, DB) at a given level of b implies the same value of dW
db (b). For example, any primitives
consistent with these three moments at b = 0:5w in Figure 2 would lead to dW
db (b = 0:5w) = 0:035.
Changes in the primitives a⁄ect the marginal welfare gain only through these three moments be-
cause of envelope conditions that arise from agent optimization (see also Chetty 2006a). Thus, the
three moments exactly identify the welfare gain from UI.
The same concept of exact identi￿cation underlies the consumption-based formula for optimal
UI bene￿ts of Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006a) and the reservation-wage formula of Shimer and
Werning (2007). Each of these papers identi￿es a di⁄erent su¢ cient statistic for welfare analysis.
One advantage of the moral hazard vs. liquidity method is that it requires data only on unemploy-
ment durations, which are typically more precise and widely available than data on consumption
or reservation wages. In addition, this method does not rely on consumption-labor separability
(u = v) or a speci￿c parametrization of the utility function, and can be easily implemented when
bene￿ts have ￿nite duration (B < T).16
The general advantage of exact identi￿cation methods relative to the structural approach is
that they require much less information about preferences and technology. For instance, (14) is
16The formula here does, however, assume separability of utility over consumption and search e⁄ort in the un-
employed state. Complementarities between ct and st can be handled by estimating the cross-partial using the
technique in Chetty (2006b).
17invariant to assumptions about market completeness, as measured by the asset limit L and the cost
of private insurance !(z). Structural approaches, in contrast, often require assumptions such as
no intertemporal smoothing or no private insurance to operationalize the analysis. Moreover, even
granted such assumptions, it is challenging to identify every primitive consistently in view of model
mis-speci￿cation and omitted variable concerns. A biased estimate of any one of the structural
primitives creates bias in the welfare analysis. Since it is easier to estimate a small set of elasticities
using credible identi￿cation strategies, exact identi￿cation is likely to yield more empirically and
theoretically robust welfare conclusions.
The disadvantage of (existing) exact identi￿cation strategies is the limited scope of questions
that they can answer. One cannot, for example, make statements about the welfare gain from an
inde￿nite (B = T) UI bene￿t using the method develop above when the variation in the data is
only in ￿nite duration (B < T) policies. In addition, because the elasticity inputs to the formula
are endogenous to the policy itself, exact identi￿cation can only be used to calculate marginal
welfare e⁄ects ￿that is, the e⁄ect of local changes in policy around observed values. Structural
methods, in contrast, can in principle be used to simulate the welfare e⁄ect of any policy change
once the primitives have been estimated, since the primitives are by de￿nition exogenous to policy
changes.17
In the remainder of the paper, I calculate the welfare gain from raising the UI bene￿t level in
the U.S. by estimating @s0
@b and @s0
@A0. I compare the results of this method with results of other
approaches in the existing literature in section 5.
3 Empirical Analysis I: The Role of Constraints
3.1 Estimation Strategy
The objective of the empirical analysis is to estimate the liquidity and total bene￿t e⁄ects for
liquidity-constrained and unconstrained households. The empirical strategy follows from the pos-
itive analysis in section 2.2; I essentially estimate the slope of the four curves simulated in Figure
1. I begin by comparing the e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on durations for unconstrained and constrained
individuals. This comparison gives an indication of the importance of liquidity relative to moral
hazard. For instance, if the e⁄ects of bene￿ts on durations were much stronger in the unconstrained
17In practice, structural estimation generally relies on out-of-sample parametric extrapolations to make statements
about policies outside the region observed in the data. Using such extrapolations, one could potentially extend the
exact identi￿cation welfare results outside the observed region as well.
18group, it would be unlikely that liquidity e⁄ects are large.
To implement this heterogeneity analysis, I divide individuals into unconstrained and con-
strained groups and estimate bene￿t-duration elasticities for each group using cross-state and time
variation in unemployment bene￿t levels. The ideal de￿nition of the unconstrained group would
be the set of households whose marginal utility is not sensitive to transitory income shocks ￿i.e.,
those who have ￿ = u0(cu
t ) ￿ v0(ce
t) ’ 0. Unfortunately, there is no panel dataset that contains
high-frequency information on both household consumption and labor supply in the U.S. I there-
fore use proxies to identify households that can smooth consumption intertemporally, who should
have ￿ ’ 0 as shown in the simulations above.18
The primary proxy I use is liquid wealth net of unsecured debt at the time of job loss, which
I term ￿net wealth.￿ Browning and Crossley (2001), Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005), and Sulli-
van (2007) report evidence from various panel datasets showing that households with little or no
￿nancial assets prior to job loss su⁄er consumption drops during unemployment that are mitigated
by provision of UI bene￿ts. In contrast, households with higher assets exhibit little sensitivity of
consumption to unemployment or UI bene￿t levels.19
I also consider two secondary proxies: spousal work status and mortgage status prior to job
loss. Browning and Crossley ￿nd larger consumption drops and higher sensitivity to UI among
single-earner households. Their interpretation of this ￿nding is that those with a second income
source are more likely to be able to borrow since at least one person is employed.20 The mortgage
proxy is motivated by Gruber￿ s (1998) ￿nding that fewer than 5% of the unemployed sell their
homes during a spell, whereas renters move much more frequently. Consequently, an individual
making mortgage payments before job loss e⁄ectively has less ability to smooth the remainder of
his consumption (Chetty and Szeidl 2007), and is more likely to be constrained than a renter.
Although these proxies predict being constrained on average, they are imperfect predictors for
two reasons. First, some households classi￿ed as unconstrained are presumably misallocated to
the constrained group and vice-versa. Second, no household truly has ￿ = 0 because insurance
markets are likely to be incomplete. There is therefore a small liquidity e⁄ect even among the
18An alternative strategy, which I do not pursue here because of data limitations, is to distinguish households by
their ability to smooth consumption across states through risk-sharing mechanisms.
19Related evidence is given by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), who ￿nd that consumption-income co-
movement is much larger for low-asset households.
20A countervailing e⁄ect is that households with a single earner may be able to maintain their prior standard of
living more easily if the other earner can enter the labor force to make up for the lost income. Browning and Crossley￿ s
￿ndings suggest that this e⁄ect is dominated by the added intertemporal smoothing capacity of dual earners, so that
on net households with two earners are less constrained.
19groups classi￿ed as unconstrained, as shown in Figure 1. Since I attribute the entire response
among the group classi￿ed as unconstrained to moral hazard, both of these misclassi￿cation errors
lead to underestimation of the liquidity e⁄ect relative to moral hazard.
3.2 Data
I use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) panels spanning 1985-
2000. Each SIPP panel surveys households at four month intervals for 2-4 years. Relative to other
widely used datasets such as the CPS and PSID, the main bene￿ts of the SIPP are the availability
of asset data, weekly data on employment status, data on UI bene￿t receipt, and large sample size.
Starting from the universe of job separations in the pooled SIPP panels, I restrict attention to
prime-age males who (a) report searching for a job, (b) are not on temporary layo⁄, (c) have at least
three months of work history in the survey (so that pre-unemployment wages can be computed),
and (d) took up UI bene￿ts within one month after job loss.21 Details on the sample construction
and SIPP database are given in Appendix B. The restrictions leave 4,560 unemployment spells
in the core analysis sample. Asset data are generally collected only once in each panel, so pre-
unemployment asset data is available for approximately half of these observations.
The ￿rst column of Table 1 gives summary statistics for the core sample. Monetary values are
in real 1990 dollars in this and all subsequent tables. The median UI recipient is a high school
graduate and has pre-UI gross annual earnings of $20,711. Perhaps the most striking statistic is
pre-unemployment wealth: median liquid wealth net of unsecured debt is only $128, suggesting that
many unemployed individuals may not be in a position to smooth consumption while unemployed.
Information on UI laws was obtained from the Employment and Training Administration (var-
ious years) and supplemented with information directly from individual states. Unfortunately,
measurement error and inadequate information about pre-unemployment wages for many claimants
make it di¢ cult to predict each claimant￿ s bene￿t level precisely. I therefore use three independent
methods to proxy for each claimant￿ s (unobserved) actual UI bene￿ts. First, I use average bene￿ts
for each state/year pair obtained from the Department of Labor in lieu of each individual￿ s actual
UI bene￿t amount. Second, I proxy for the actual bene￿t using maximum weekly bene￿t amounts,
which are the primary source of variation in bene￿t levels across states, since most states replace
21Restricting the sample to those who take up UI could lead to selection bias because the takeup decision is
endogenous to the bene￿t level (Anderson and Meyer 1997). I ￿nd that the elasticity of takeup with respect to the
bene￿t level is similar across the constrained and unconstrained groups, suggesting that endogeneity is unlikely to be
responsible for the heterogeneous e⁄ects estimated below.
2050% of a claimant￿ s wages up to a maximum bene￿t level. Third, I simulate each individual￿ s
weekly UI bene￿t using a two-stage procedure. In the ￿rst stage, I predict each claimant￿ s pre-
unemployment annual income using education, age, occupation, and other demographics. In the
second stage, I predict each claimant￿ s unemployment bene￿ts using a simulation program that as-
signs each claimant a bene￿t based on the predicted wage, state, and year of claim. See Appendix
B for further details on the motivation for and implementation of this two-stage procedure.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Graphical Evidence and Non-Parametric Tests
I begin by providing graphical evidence on the e⁄ect of unemployment bene￿ts on durations in
constrained and unconstrained groups. First consider the asset proxy for constraints. I divide
households into four quartiles based on their net liquid wealth. Table 1 shows summary statistics
for each of the four quartiles. Households in the lower net liquid wealth quartiles are poorer and
less educated, but the di⁄erences between the four groups are not very large. As a result, UI
bene￿t levels are fairly constant across the groups. In particular, the replacement rate ￿de￿ned
as each individual￿ s simulated unemployment bene￿t divided by his predicted wage ￿is close to
50% on average in all four quartiles. This similarity of bene￿t and income levels suggests that
di⁄erences in bene￿t-duration elasticities across the quartiles are unlikely to be driven purely by
di⁄erences in the levels around which the elasticities are estimated.
Figures 3a-d show the e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on job-￿nding rates for households in the each of the
four quartiles of the net wealth distribution. Since ex-post asset levels are endogenous to duration
of unemployment, households for whom asset data are available only after job loss are excluded
when constructing these ￿gures. Including these households turns out to have little e⁄ect on the
results, as we will see below in the regression analysis. I construct the ￿gures by ￿rst dividing
the full sample of UI claimants into two categories: those that are in (state, year) pairs that have
average weekly bene￿t amounts above the sample median and those below the median. I then plot
Kaplan-Meier survival curves for these two groups using the households in the relevant net wealth
quartile. Note that the di⁄erences in average individual replacement rates between the low and
high-bene￿t are fairly similar in the four quartiles.
These and all subsequent survival curves plotted using the SIPP data are adjusted for the ￿seam
e⁄ect￿in panel surveys. Individuals are interviewed at 4 month intervals in the SIPP and tend to
repeat answers about weekly job status in the past four months. Consequently, a disproportionately
21large number of transitions in labor force status are reported on the ￿seam￿between interviews,
leading to arti￿cial spikes in the hazard rate at 4 and 8 months. These spikes are smoothed out by
￿tting a Cox model with a time-varying indicator for being on a seam between interviews, and then
recovering the baseline hazards to construct a seam-adjusted Kaplan-Meier curve. The resulting
survival curves give the probability of remaining unemployed after t weeks for an individual who
never crosses an interview seam. The results are similar if the raw data is used without adjusting
for the seam e⁄ect.
Figure 3a shows that higher UI bene￿ts lead to much lower job-￿nding rates for individuals in
the lowest wealth quartile. For example, 15 weeks after job loss, 55% of individuals in low-bene￿t
state/years are still unemployed, compared with 68% of individuals in high-bene￿t state/years.
A nonparametric Wilcoxon test rejects the null hypothesis that the survival curves are identical
with p < 0:01.22 Figure 3b constructs the same survival curves for the second wealth quartile.
UI bene￿ts have a smaller e⁄ect on durations in this group. At 15 weeks, 63% of individuals in
the low-bene￿t group are still unemployed, vs. 70% in the high bene￿t group. Equality of the
survival curves is rejected with p = 0:04. Figures 3c and 3d show that e⁄ect of UI on durations
virtually disappears in the third and fourth quartiles of the wealth distribution. Not surprisingly,
the equality of the survival curves is not rejected in these two groups. The fact that UI has little
e⁄ect on durations in the unconstrained groups suggests that it induces little moral hazard among
these households.
The secondary proxies con￿rm these results. Figure 4a shows that UI bene￿ts have a clear,
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on job ￿nding rates among households that are paying o⁄ mortgages
prior to job loss. In contrast, Figure 4b shows that the e⁄ect is smaller for households that are not
paying o⁄ mortgages and are hence less constrained.23 Results are similar for the spousal work
proxy: UI bene￿ts have a much larger e⁄ect on job ￿nding hazards for single-earner families than
dual-earner families (see Figure 2 in Chetty (2005)).
The preceding results show that the interaction e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts and wealth (or other proxies)
on durations is negative. An alternative approach to evaluating the importance of liquidity is to
study the direct e⁄ect of the cross-sectional variation in wealth on durations, testing in particular
22The non-parametric test is conducted on the raw data because adjusting for the seam e⁄ect requires a parametric
assumption about the hazard rate.
23In contrast with the other proxies, the constrained types in this speci￿cation (homeowners with mortgages) have
higher income, education, and wealth than the unconstrained types, who are primarily renters. This makes it
somewhat less likely that the di⁄erences in the bene￿t elasticity of duration across constrained and unconstrained
groups is spuriously driven by other di⁄erences across the groups such as income or education.
22if durations are an increasing and concave function of wealth. I focus on the variation in UI
bene￿ts because changes in UI laws are credibly exogenous to individuals￿preferences. In contrast,
conditional on demographics and income, cross-sectional variation in wealth holdings arises from
heterogeneity in tastes for savings, confounding the e⁄ect of wealth on duration in the cross-section.
For example, UI claimants with higher assets are also likely to have lower discount rates or higher
anticipated expenses (e.g., college tuition payments), and hence may be reluctant to deplete their
assets to ￿nance a longer spell of unemployment.24 In practice, I ￿nd no robust relationship between
assets and unemployment durations in the cross-section (as indicated by the mean durations by
quartile reported in Table 1), consistent with the results of Lentz (2007). This ￿nding underscores
the importance of using exogenous variation such as UI bene￿ts for identi￿cation. The same issue
also motivates the use of severance pay as a source of variation in wealth to identify the liquidity
e⁄ect in section 4.
3.3.2 Hazard Model Estimates
I evaluate the robustness of the graphical results by estimating a set of Cox hazard models in Table
2. Let hi;t denote the unemployment exit hazard rate for individual i in week t of an unemployment
spell, ￿t the ￿baseline￿hazard rate in week t, bi the unemployment bene￿t level for individual i,
and Xi;t a set of controls. Throughout, I censor durations at 50 weeks to reduce the in￿ uence of
outliers and focus on search behavior in the year after job loss.
Since the welfare gain formula (14) calls for estimates of the e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on search
behavior at the beginning of the spell (@s0=@b), I estimate hazard models of the following form:
loghi;t = ￿t + ￿1 logbi + ￿2t ￿ logbi + ￿3Xi;t (17)
Here, the coe¢ cient ￿1 gives the elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to UI bene￿ts at the
beginning of the spell (t = 0) because the interaction term t￿logbi captures any time-varying e⁄ect
of UI bene￿ts on hazards. Note that the search model does not make a clear prediction about the
sign of ￿2. The e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts could diminish over time (￿2 < 0) because the number of weeks
for which bene￿ts remain available is falling. But ￿2 could also be positive because households
are increasingly constrained and thus more sensitive to cash-on-hand late in the spell. In practice,
there is no robust, statistically signi￿cant pattern in the ￿2 coe¢ cients across the quartiles, and I
24More generally, wealthier individuals may have unobserved characteristics (e.g. skills, job search technologies)
that lead to di⁄erent durations for reasons unrelated to their wealth.
23therefore do not report them in Table 2 in the interest of space.25
I ￿rst estimate (17) on the full sample to identify the unconditional e⁄ect of UI on the hazard
rate. In this speci￿cation, as in most others, I use the average UI bene￿t level in the individual￿ s
(state,year) pair to proxy for bi in light of the measurement-error issues discussed above. This
speci￿cation includes the following controls: state, year, industry, and occupation ￿xed e⁄ects;
a 10 piece log-linear spline for the claimant￿ s pre-unemployment wage; linear controls for total
(illiquid+liquid) wealth, age, education; and dummies for marital status, and being on the seam
between interviews to adjust for the seam e⁄ect. Standard errors in this and all subsequent
speci￿cations are clustered by state. The estimate in column 1 of Table 2 indicates that a 10%
increase in the UI bene￿t rate reduces the hazard rate by 5.3% in the pooled sample, consistent
with the estimates of prior studies. The estimate of ￿2 = 0:001 (s.e. = 0:008), indicating that
there is no detectable variation in the UI bene￿t e⁄ect over the spell.
To examine the heterogeneity of the UI e⁄ect, I estimate separate coe¢ cients for each of the
four quartiles of the net wealth distribution. These speci￿cations include all households for which
asset data are available either before or after the spell. Consistent with the graphical evidence,
the estimates are similar (but less precise) if only households with ex-ante asset data are included.
Let Qi;j denote an indicator variable that is 1 if agent i belongs to quartile j of the wealth
distribution. Let ￿t;j denote the baseline job-￿nding hazard for individuals in quartile j in week
s of the unemployment spell. Columns 2-5 of Table 2 report estimates of f￿
j
1gj=1;2;3;4 from the
following strati￿ed Cox model:
loghitj = ￿t;j + ￿
j
1Qi;j logbi + ￿
j
2Qi;j(t ￿ logbi) + ￿3Xitj (18)
In this equation, ￿
j
1 corresponds to the elasticity of the hazard rate w.r.t. UI bene￿ts at t = 0 in
quartile j of the net wealth distribution. Speci￿cation (2) of Table 2 reports estimates of (18) with
no controls (no X). The e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts declines monotonically with net wealth. Among
households in the lowest quartile of net wealth, a 10% increase in UI bene￿ts reduces the hazard
rate by 7.2%. In contrast, there is a much weaker association between the level of UI bene￿ts and
the hazard among households in the third and fourth quartiles of net wealth. The null hypothesis
that UI bene￿ts have the same e⁄ect on hazard rates in the ￿rst and fourth quartiles is rejected
25The only stable pattern across the speci￿cations is that ￿2 is slightly negative in the highest wealth quartile
(around ￿0:03). This could be because households that are intially unconstrained become increasingly liquidity
constrained as they deplete their bu⁄er stocks.
24with p < 0:05, as is the null hypothesis that the mean UI e⁄ect for below-median wealth households
is the same as that for above-median wealth households.
Speci￿cation (3) replicates (2) with the full set of controls used in column (1), including state
and year ￿xed e⁄ects so that the coe¢ cients are identi￿ed from changes in UI laws within states
rather than cross-state comparisons. This speci￿cation also includes interactions of the wage spline
and industry/occupation dummies with the wealth quartile indicators, allowing these variables to
have di⁄erent e⁄ects across the quartiles. The pattern of the coe¢ cients is unchanged, but the
magnitudes of the coe¢ cients in the ￿rst three quartiles is larger, perhaps because exogenous
changes in UI laws are more e⁄ectively isolated when the controls are included.
In speci￿cations (4) and (5), I explore robustness to changes in the de￿nition of bi. Both of these
speci￿cations include the control set used in (3). Column (4) uses the maximum UI bene￿t level
in individual i￿ s state/year and column (5) uses the simulated bene￿t for each individual i using
the two-stage procedure described above. In the maximum bene￿t speci￿cation, the coe¢ cient
estimates are all smaller than their counterparts in (3), but the pattern is preserved: the e⁄ect
of bene￿ts is larger for low-wealth individuals and the hypothesis tests of equivalent e⁄ects in the
lower and upper quartiles are both rejected with p < 0:01. In the individual simulated bene￿t
speci￿cation, UI bene￿ts are estimated to have little e⁄ect on durations in the highest wealth
quartile, and the elasticity estimates are declining from quartiles 2 to 4. However, the estimate
for the ￿rst quartile is smaller than that in the second quartile, breaking the monotonic declining
pattern obtained with the other measures of bene￿ts.
I have estimated a set of speci￿cations analogous to (18) for the spousal work and mortgage
proxies. An example is in column 6 of Table 2, which reports estimates of the e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on
job-￿nding hazards for households with and without a mortgage prior to job loss. This speci￿cation
includes the same controls as in column 3, except that the relevant covariates are interacted with
the mortgage indicator rather than the asset quartiles. The estimates indicate that bene￿ts have
a considerably larger e⁄ect on durations among households that have mortgages. See Table 3 in
Chetty (2005) for additional estimates using the spousal work and mortgage proxies.
I have also ￿t a variety of other speci￿cations to further probe the robustness of the results
(Table 2b in Chetty (2005)). The estimates are similar when high income individuals are excluded
or temporary layo⁄s are included. Results are also similar with controls for the average wage
income in each state and year from the BLS, or when the wealth quartiles are de￿ned in terms
of wealth divided by wages. Unlike with liquid wealth, I ￿nd no systematic link between home
25equity and the bene￿t-duration elasticity. This is consistent with the importance of liquidity, since
accessing home equity is di¢ cult when one is unemployed (Hurst and Sta⁄ord 2004). Finally, I ￿nd
no relationship between the level of bene￿ts and durations for a control group of individuals who
do not receive UI . This ￿placebo test￿supports the identi￿cation assumption that the variation
in UI bene￿ts is orthogonal to unobservable determinants of durations.
In summary, the SIPP data indicate that the link between unemployment bene￿ts and dura-
tions documented in earlier studies is driven by a subset of the population that has limited ability
to smooth consumption. This pattern is suggestive of a substantial liquidity e⁄ect. As shown in
Figure 1, if one were to assume that substitution e⁄ects (@s0
@w jB) are similar across unconstrained
and constrained groups, this evidence would be su¢ cient to infer that liquidity e⁄ects are large.
However, this assumption may be untenable: constrained households might have di⁄erent prefer-
ences (locally or globally) that generate larger substitution e⁄ects than unconstrained households.
I therefore turn to a second empirical strategy to identify the magnitude of the liquidity e⁄ect.
4 Empirical Analysis II: Severance Pay and Durations
4.1 Estimation Strategy
The ideal way to estimate the liquidity e⁄ect would be a randomized experiment where some
job losers are given lump-sum grants or annuity payments while others are not. Lacking such
an experiment, I exploit variation in severance pay policies across ￿rms in the U.S.26 Severance
payments are made either as lump-sum grants at the time of job loss or in the form of salary
continuation (short-duration annuities).27 All severance packages are unconditional payments that
do not distort marginal incentives to search for a new job. Thus, any causal e⁄ect of severance
pay on unemployment durations re￿ ects a pure liquidity e⁄ect.
The most common severance policy is one week of wages per year of service at the ￿rm. Some
companies have ￿ atter or steeper pro￿les with respect to job tenure, and others make no severance
payments at all (Lee Hecht Harrison 2001). Many companies have minimum job tenure thresholds
26Receipt of severance pay intended to supplement UI bene￿ts typically does not a⁄ect eligibility for UI, although
some states can delay bene￿ts if the claimant receives ￿wages in lieu of notice￿(Kodryzcki 1998, McCulloch 1998).
In Pennsylvania, the unemployment compensation law explicitly states that severance pay does not a⁄ect UI bene￿ts
(Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry 2007). Restricting the analysis to the Pennsylvania dataset below
yields results similar to those obtained for the pooled sample.
27Since the form of the severance payment cannot be determined in the data, I treat all severance payments as
cash grants. To the extent that the severance is paid as salary continuation, the formula for
dW
db in Corollary 1 will
be more accurate because there is less reliance on the approximate annuity conversion in (13).
26to be eligible for severance pay, ranging from 3 to 5 years. There is little variation in severance
packages within a given ￿rm and tenure bracket. Hence, conditional on tenure, the variation in
receipt of severance pay is driven primarily by di⁄erences in policies across ￿rms.
I estimate the e⁄ect of severance pay using hazard models similar to those above:
loghi;t = ￿t + ￿1sevi + ￿2sevi ￿ t + ￿Xi;t (19)
where sevi is an indicator for receipt of severance pay. The coe¢ cient ￿1 identi￿es the e⁄ect
of cash grants on job ￿nding hazards at the beginning of the spell if receipt of severance pay is
orthogonal to other determinants of durations. After estimating the baseline model, I evaluate
this orthogonality condition.
4.2 Data
The data for this portion of the study come from two surveys conducted by Mathematica on behalf
of the Department of Labor. The datasets contain information on unemployment durations, demo-
graphic characteristics, and data on receipt of severance pay. The ￿rst dataset is a representative
sample of job losers in Pennsylvania in 1991. The second dataset is a sample of unemployment
durations in 25 states in 1998 that oversamples UI exhaustees. I reweight the data using the
sampling weights to obtain estimates for a representative sample of job losers.
For comparability to the preceding results, I make the same exclusions after pooling the two
datasets. I include only prime-age males and discard all individuals who expected a recall at the
time of layo⁄ (including temporary layo⁄s does not a⁄ect the results, as above). These exclusions
leave 2,441 individuals in the sample, of whom 471 (18%) report receiving a severance payment.
Details on the Mathematica datasets and sample construction are given in Appendix C.
Two measures of ￿unemployment duration￿are available in these datasets: (1) an administrative
record of the number of weeks for which UI bene￿ts were paid and (2) the number of weeks from
the end date of the individual￿ s previous job to the (self-reported) start of the next job. For
consistency with the SIPP estimates, I focus on the second measure here. Results are similar, and
more precisely estimated, using the administrative measure.
Table 3 shows summary statistics for severance pay recipients and non-recipients. The sample
generally looks quite similar on observables to the SIPP sample used above. Given the minimum
tenure eligibility requirement, it is not surprising that severance pay recipients have much higher
median job tenures than non-recipients. Correspondingly, severance pay recipients are older and
27higher in observable characteristics than non-recipients. These di⁄erences underscore why one must
be careful in drawing causal inferences from comparing severance pay recipients and non-recipients.
4.3 Results
I begin again with graphical evidence. Figure 5 shows Kaplan-Meier survival curves for two groups
of individuals: those who received severance pay and those who did not. Since pre-unemployment
job tenure is an important determinant of severance pay and is also highly positively correlated with
durations, I control for it throughout the analysis. These survival curves have been adjusted for
tenure by ￿tting a cox model with tenure as the only regressor and recovering the baseline hazards
for each group. Severance pay recipients have signi￿cantly lower job ￿nding hazards. As a result,
75% of individuals who received severance pay remain unemployed after 10 weeks, compared with
68% among those who received no severance payment.28
An obvious concern in interpreting this result as evidence of a liquidity e⁄ect is that it may re￿ ect
correlation rather than causality because severance pay recipients di⁄er from non-recipients. For
instance, ￿rms that o⁄er severance packages might do so because their workers have accumulated
more speci￿c human capital and are likely to take a long time to ￿nd a suitable new job. This
would induce a spurious correlation between severance pay and durations in the cross-section.
I use three approaches to investigate the causality of severance pay. First, I investigate whether
the e⁄ect of severance pay di⁄ers across constrained and unconstrained groups. The model in
section 2 indicates that severance pay ￿ which is a minor fraction of lifetime wealth ￿ should
causally a⁄ect durations only among households that cannot smooth consumption. In contrast,
alternative explanations such as the one proposed above would not necessarily predict a di⁄erential
e⁄ect of severance pay across constrained and unconstrained households. Hence, the heterogeneity
of the estimated severance pay e⁄ect yields insight into the causality of severance pay.
Implementing this test requires division of households into constrained and unconstrained
groups. Unfortunately, the Mathematica surveys do not contain data on assets and the other
proxies for constraint status used in the SIPP data. To overcome this problem, I predict assets
for each household with an equation estimated using OLS on the SIPP sample. The prediction
equation is a linear function of age, wage, education, and marital status. I then divide households
into two groups, above and below the median level of predicted assets. Note that results based
28This result is consistent with the ￿ndings of Kodrzycki (1998), who compares unemployment durations among
severance pay recipients and non-recipients for a sample of displaced workers who attended training programs.
28on predicted assets (using the same prediction equation) and reported assets are similar in the
SIPP data: the total elasticity of duration w.r.t. UI bene￿ts is much larger among households with
predicted assets below the median than for those above the median. Hence, the predicted asset
measure succeeds in identifying the households whose search behavior is sensitive to UI bene￿ts.
Figures 6a-b replicate Figure 5 for the two groups. Figure 6a shows that receipt of severance pay
is associated with a large increase in survival probabilities for constrained (low asset) households.
Figure 6b shows that severance pay has a much smaller e⁄ect on search behavior for households
that are likely to be wealthier. Results are similar if households are split into constrained and
unconstrained groups on the basis of age or income alone. Results are also una⁄ected by changes
in the functional form of the asset prediction equation, prediction via quantile regression instead of
OLS, or trimming of outliers. The fact that severance pay a⁄ects durations only in the group of
households that are sensitive to UI bene￿ts (those who are likely to be constrained) supports the
claim that liquidity e⁄ects drive a substantial portion of the UI-duration link.
As a second approach to examining the causality of severance pay, I assess the sensitivity of
the severance pay e⁄ect to controlling for observed heterogeneity. I estimate variants of the Cox
model in (19), censoring all durations at 50 weeks as in the SIPP data. I ￿rst estimate a model
with only a linear tenure control and a the time-varying interaction of severance pay with weeks
unemployed. I then estimate the model with the following control set: ten piece linear splines
for log pre-unemployment wage and job tenure; dummies for prior industry, occupation, and year;
and controls for age, marital status, and education (using a dummy for dropout status and college
graduation). The ￿rst two columns of Table 4 show that receipt of severance pay is estimated to
lower the job-￿nding hazard at the beginning of the spell by ￿1 = ￿18% in the tenure-control and
￿1 = ￿23% in the full-control speci￿cation. The estimated value of ￿2 = 1:3% (s.e. = 0:2%) in
both speci￿cations. The e⁄ect of severance pay on search intensity diminishes over time, as one
might expect if individuals deplete the grant over the course of the spell.
Speci￿cations (3) and (4) estimate separate severance pay coe¢ cients for constrained (below-
median predicted assets) and unconstrained (above-median) households. The baseline hazards
are strati￿ed by predicted wealth group (above/below median) and the wage spline and indus-
try/occupation dummies are interacted with the predicted wealth dummy, as in the SIPP speci￿-
cations.29 Consistent with Figure 6, the estimates indicate that severance pay reduces initial job
29Unlike in the SIPP speci￿cations, I restrict the time interaction of severance pay with weeks unemployed to be the
same across wealth groups here in order to increase power. Introducing an interaction yields similar point estimates
but larger standard errors because the number of severance pay recipients is relatively small.
29￿nding hazards in the low-wealth group by 46-49%, but has little or no e⁄ect in the high-wealth
group. The hypothesis that the e⁄ect of severance pay is the same in the low and high wealth
groups is rejected with p < 0:01. Predicting whether the individual is above or below median
wealth directly in the ￿rst stage, and interacting the predicted probability with the severance pay
dummy when estimating the Cox model yields the same conclusion.
Finally, as a third robustness check, I test whether larger severance payments lead to longer
unemployment durations. I implement this intensive margin test by investigating whether the
e⁄ect of severance pay receipt di⁄ers by individuals￿job tenure. Since the severance amount
is an increasing function of job tenure, the indicator for receipt of severance pay should have a
larger e⁄ect on durations among individuals with long job tenure.30 I divide the pooled sample
(including both severance recipients and non-recipients) into two groups ￿short and long tenure
￿based on whether their job tenure is above or below the median for severance recipients (4.83
years). Based on data in Lee Hecht Harrisson (2001), the mean severance amount conditional on
receipt of severance is equivalent to 2 weeks of wages in the short tenure group vs. 13 weeks of
wages in the long tenure group (see Appendix C).
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 replicate speci￿cations 3 and 4, stratifying the baseline hazards by
the short job tenure indicator and interacting it with the severance pay indicator. For individuals
who have short job tenure, receipt of severance pay reduces initial job ￿nding hazards by 10-14%,
compared with 25-34% for the long tenure group.31 The hypothesis that the e⁄ect of severance
pay is the same in the low and high tenure groups is rejected with p < 0:03.
Although these ￿ndings all point toward a substantial liquidity e⁄ect, the evidence cannot be
viewed as fully conclusive because the variation in cash grants is not randomized. One might,
for instance, be concerned that low wealth workers with job-speci￿c capital are especially likely
to select into and stay at ￿rms that o⁄er severance payments, explaining the patterns in Table 4.
Reassuringly, in a followup study that exploits quasi-experimental variation in severance payments
created by a discontinuity in the Austrian severance pay system, Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007)
document a substantial e⁄ect of severance pay on durations, consistent with the evidence here.
Further research along these lines is needed to obtain more precise and compelling estimates of the
30Data on actual severance amounts are available for a subset of the Pennsylvania dataset. I ￿nd a positive
association between the reported amounts and durations, but the results are not statistically signi￿cant because of
the small number of observations.
31An alternative interpretation of speci￿cations 5 and 6 is that tenure is used as an instrument for the severance
amount, with the direct e⁄ects of tenure on duration netted out by comparison to the group of non-recipients. The
correlation between job tenure and durations is larger among severance pay recipients than non-recipients, which is
consistent with a liquidity e⁄ect because the severance amount rises with job tenure for severance recipients.
30liquidity e⁄ect in the U.S.
5 Calibration: Welfare Implications
I now use the hazard model estimates to calculate the average liquidity to moral hazard ratio in
the population and the average welfare gain from raising b. Let h0 denote the job ￿nding hazard
in the ￿rst week for an agent who receives the mean UI bene￿t b and does not receive a severance
payment. Let hs
1 denote the hazard for an individual who receives the severance payment and hb
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where b denotes the mean weekly UI bene￿t and S denotes the mean total value of the severance
payment. Based on a survey of ￿rms by Lee Hecht Harrison (2001), the mean severance payment
equals 10.7 weeks of wages (see Appendix C). At the mean bene￿t level of b = 0:5w, this implies
S = 21:4b ￿that is, receipt of severance pay is equivalent to an annuity payment of b per week for
21.4 weeks. The full-controls estimates from column 1 of Table 2 and column 2 of Table 4 imply
hb
1=h0 = exp(￿0:58) and hs













Around the level of bene￿ts observed in the data (b ￿ 0:5w), the liquidity e⁄ect accounts for roughly
60% of the e⁄ect of marginal changes in the bene￿t level on unemployment durations.
Welfare Gain of UI. To calculate "D;b, recall from speci￿cation 1 of Table 2 that the e⁄ect of
bene￿ts on the hazard rate does not vary signi￿cantly over the spell. Using the approximation that
the bene￿t elasticity and baseline hazard rates are constant, D = 1
h and "D;b = ￿
@ logh0
@ logb = 0:53.32
Shimer and Werning (2007) report that there are 7.7 million unemployed individuals and 135 million
32The elasticity "D;b called for in (14) includes the e⁄ect of the change in ￿. The estimated elasticity does not fully
include the e⁄ect of ￿ because the variation UI bene￿ts a⁄ects only some agents whereas taxes are levied more broadly.
This discrepancy is likely to be quantitatively unimportant because the UI tax rate is very small (￿ < 0:01w). In
the numerical simulations, the elasticities with ￿ ￿xed and ￿ variable are virtually identical.
31workers in the U.S.: ￿ = 135
142:7 = 0:946. Using the approximation that "D;b = "DB;b, (14) yields
dW
db































Starting from b = 0:5w, a $1 balanced-budget increase in the weekly bene￿t level would have raised
each individual￿ s utility by the equivalent of a 4 cent increase in the weekly wage, or about $2.00
per year. Aggregating over the population, the welfare gain of raising the UI bene￿t level by a
dollar is equivalent to an increase in GDP of $290 million. Starting from a mean bene￿t of $200
per week, raising the bene￿t level by 10% would yield an aggregate welfare gain equivalent to about
$5.9 billion, roughly 0.05 percent of GDP.
It is important to recognize that these welfare gain calculations are valid only locally around
b = 0:5w. The liquidity e⁄ect and marginal welfare gain of UI will be larger when b is low
and small when b is high, as illustrated in the numerical simulations in section 2. The local
welfare gain estimate does tell us that the optimal wage replacement rate for UI exceeds 50% since
dW
db (b = 0:5w) > 0. In addition, the evidence suggests that a replacement rate near 50% may be
near optimal since dW
db (b = 0:5w) is small.33
It is interesting to compare the welfare implications of the revealed preference approach with
those of previous studies. Hansen and Imrohoglu (1992) ￿nd that the optimal replacement rate is
65% if moral hazard is low but less than 10% if moral hazard is high in their baseline simulation.
They conclude that evidence on moral hazard is needed to assess which case is relevant. The
present paper provides empirical evidence that the low moral hazard case is the relevant one, and
yields welfare implications consistent with Hansen and Imrohoglu￿ s simulation for that case. Baily
(1978) and Gruber (1997) use a consumption-based exact identi￿cation approach to show that
@W
@b (b = 0:5w) < 0 using estimates of the consumption drop during unemployment. Indeed, their
preferred calibrations using log utility imply an optimal bene￿t rate close to zero. The reason for
the sharp discrepancy is that the liquidity e⁄ect estimated here is inconsistent with the relatively low
degrees of risk aversion considered by Baily and Gruber.34 Shimer and Werning (2007) implement
33This calculation ignores ￿rm layo⁄ behavior (Feldstein 1978, Topel 1983) and general equilibrium e⁄ects (Ace-









cu where ￿ denotes the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion at
cu. Gruber estimates
cu
ce = 0:9, which requires ￿ ’ 5 to be consistent with a 60% liquidity e⁄ect. A strength of the
formula proposed here is that it does not require estimate of risk aversion, which could plausibly be as high as ￿ = 5
in the context of moderate shocks such as unemployment but much lower in other contexts (Chetty and Szeidl 2007).
32their reservation-wage formula using an estimate of the sensitivity of reservation wages to bene￿ts
from Feldstein and Poterba (1984). They ￿nd that a $1 increase in the bene￿t level would yield a
net welfare gain equivalent to raising GDP by $2.4 billion, four times larger than the estimate here.
As Shimer and Werning observe, the credibility of existing reservation wage elasticity estimates is
questionable, particularly in view of more recent evidence that UI bene￿t levels have little impact
on subsequent wage rates (e.g. Card, Chetty, Weber 2007, van Ours and Vodopivec 2008).
Alternative Policy Instruments: Loans. In the analysis above, the unemployment bene￿t is
used to facilitate both intertemporal smoothing and smoothing across states. A natural alternative
instrument to resolve credit market failures is the provision of loans or UI savings accounts ((Feld-
stein and Altman (1998), Shimer and Werning (2006)). Although a formal analysis of optimal
policy with multiple instruments is outside the scope of this paper, the numerical simulations can
be used to gain some insight into how much of the welfare gain of UI could be obtained using loans.
Suppose the government provides a loan of $G upon job loss that must be repaid within GT
weeks. With this loan, the agent￿ s budget constraint is At ￿ ￿(L + G) for t ￿ GT and At ￿ ￿L








Assume b = 0:5w and all other parameters as in Figure 2. The solid curves in Figure 7 plot dW
dG
and dW
db as a function of G when the government loan has to be repaid by death (GT = T = 500).
The dashed curves plot dW
dG (G) and dW
db (G) for a short-term loan (GT = 104).
The simulations have three lessons. First, the welfare gains from providing long-term liquidity
can be quite large. The welfare gain of initiating a long-term government loan when b = 0:5w
is dW
dG (G = 0) = 0:044. The marginal welfare gain of increasing b falls rapidly with G: when
G = 5000, dW
db is 40% of the value of dW
db when G = 0. Substantial welfare gains can be achieved by
correcting credit market failures while leaving insurance markets incomplete because unemployment
shocks are small relative to permanent income.
Second, short-term loans are much less valuable than long-term loans. The marginal welfare
gain of a loan that lasts for less than 11 months is zero in this numerical example because the
private market borrowing limit (L = ￿1000) begins to bind only at t = 47. The welfare gain from
the two year loan plotted in the ￿gure is close to the value of the permanent loan initially, but
declines rapidly as G rises. Once the loan amount exceeds $3,600, the marginal value of the loan
becomes 0 because the borrowing constraint becomes slack for t ￿ 104. The UI bene￿t, in contrast,
retains a marginal value of dW
db = 0:018 because consumption ￿ uctuates signi￿cantly across states
33even when G > $3;600. Intuitively, a job loser is reluctant to take up a lot of short-term debt even
though it would help him smooth consumption because of the risk of a long spell of unemployment
(an example of precautionary savings behavior).
The ￿nal lesson pertains to the welfare value of using loans instead of the existing UI system.
The long term loan generates a strictly larger welfare gain than the UI bene￿t because UI has an
e¢ ciency cost, whereas loan provision is non-distortionary in this model. However, the di⁄erence
in the welfare gain from a $1 increase in b and a comparable increase in even the ￿rst-best costless
loan is less than a 0.5 cents of weekly wages on average. The di⁄erence is small because the moral
hazard distortion caused by UI is small in practice. It is therefore critical to quantify the moral
hazard cost of loans to determine whether loans or subsidies for job search are a better policy to
facilitate consumption smoothing.
Other Policy Implications. Recent evidence that UI does not smooth consumption for house-
holds with high assets (e.g. Browning and Crossley 2001) has been interpreted as a point in favor of
means-testing temporary income support programs. But UI does not a⁄ect unemployment dura-
tions signi￿cantly for this group either. Since means-testing generates a distortionary incentive to
save less, a universal bene￿t may maximize welfare. In addition, the evidence above implies that
e⁄orts to shorten unemployment durations through job-￿nding bonuses or more stringent search re-
quirements would yield welfare gains 60% smaller than suggested by prior studies which attributed
the entire duration response to a substitution e⁄ect.
6 Conclusion
This paper has proposed and implemented an ￿exact identi￿cation￿approach to welfare analysis.
In particular, we showed that the welfare gain from increasing the unemployment bene￿t level can
be well approximated by estimating a pair of high-level elasticities rather than identifying the full
set of primitives. The central intuition is that UI bene￿ts a⁄ect search behavior through two
channels: a welfare-enhancing ￿liquidity e⁄ect￿and a welfare-reducing moral hazard e⁄ect. The
ratio of the liquidity e⁄ect to the moral hazard e⁄ect is a su¢ cient statistic for the welfare gain
of raising the bene￿t level in a general environment. Using data from the U.S., I estimate that
the liquidity e⁄ect accounts for 60% of the marginal e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on durations at current
bene￿t rates. This estimate implies that a bene￿t equal to 50% of the pre-unemployment wage is
near optimal in a UI system that pays constant bene￿ts for six months.
Although this paper has focused on unemployment, the theoretical concepts have broader ap-
34plicability. Revealed preference can be used to calculate the welfare gains from social and private
insurance policies by separating moral hazard and liquidity e⁄ects. For example, one can calculate
the value of a health insurance program by estimating the extent to which an agent￿ s medical ex-
penditures would di⁄er if he were paid a lump-sum bene￿t rather than an indemnity bene￿t that
covers health expenses. This method does not require data on the outcomes of insurance provision,
such as health, consumption, or job match quality, which have proved to be di¢ cult to measure.35
More generally, developing exact identi￿cation strategies to analyze optimal policy in contexts
beyond insurance should be a high priority for further work. Such strategies o⁄er the promise
of combining the best feature of reduced-form empirical analysis ￿transparent and credible iden-
ti￿cation ￿with the bene￿t of structural models ￿the ability to make precise statements about
welfare.
35See Nyman (2003) and Autor and Duggan (2007) for evidence on moral hazard vs. liquidity e⁄ects in health and
disability insurance.
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37Appendix A: Proofs
Derivation of decomposition in (9).






@xt denote the e⁄ect of increasing x in














@b jB = @s0
@b because UI bene￿ts and the annuity last for only B periods by assumption.























































Proof of Proposition 1. To begin, observe that the unconditional average marginal utility of


































To derive (14), recall that J0 = (1 ￿ s0)U0(b;￿) + sV0(b;￿) +  (s0). Therefore
dJ0
db





















Next, I normalize the expression for dJ0
db by the expected welfare gain from increasing the wage by
38$1, dJ0
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Plugging this expression into the formula for dW
db above and collecting terms yields (14). QED.
Extension 1: Ex-ante Behavior. The main steps of the proof are the same as in Proposition
1. I ￿rst write dW
db in terms of marginal utilities as in (10), and then show how this representation
can be linked to (@s0
@a jB)jA0;z and @s0
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= (T + 1 ￿ pD)E0;T￿1v0(ce
t)
Using the approximation that v0(ce
t) = v0(ce
0) for all t, these expressions simplify to:
dJ￿1
db


























This marginal-utility representation is analogous to equation (21) in the proof of Proposition 1.
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Finally, plugging these expressions into the formula for dW






















@b jA0;z is the liquidity to moral hazard ratio, holding
￿xed ex-ante behaviors.
Extension 2: Stochastic Wage O⁄ers
Suppose that with probability st (controlled by search intensity) the agent is o⁄ered a wage
w ￿ wm + F(w). Assume no recall of previous o⁄ers and i.i.d. draws across periods. The agent
follows a reservation-wage policy: in each period t, there is a threshold Rt such that the agent
accepts a job only if the wage w > Rt (McCall 1970). I generalize Corollary 1 to this model in the
following steps: (1) specify the value functions, (2) write the marginal welfare gain from raising b in
terms of expected marginal utilities, and (3) relate the gap in marginal utilities to the comparative
statics of search intensity. For simplicity, assume B = T.
The value function for an individual with assets At who ￿nds and accepts a job at the beginning
of period t that pays a wage w is
Vt(w;At) = max
At+1￿L
v(At ￿ At+1 + w) + Vt+1(w;At+1).




u(At ￿ At+1 + bt) + Jt+1(At+1)
where Jt+1(At+1) is the value of entering period t + 1 unemployed with assets A. The probability
of ￿nding and accepting a job in period t is stP(w > Rt) where P(w > Rt) =
R 1




stP(w > Rt)EVt + (1 ￿ stP(w > Rt))Ut(At) ￿  (st)
40where






represents the expected value of being employed conditional on receiving an acceptable o⁄er. Let
P = P(w > R0) in what follows. The marginal welfare gain from raising the UI bene￿t is:
dJ0
db













The marginal welfare gain of raising the wage by $1 in all states and periods is
dJ0
dwm






= (T ￿ D)Ev0(ce
t) (22)
where Ev0(ce
t) denotes the average marginal utility of consumption while employed. The latter
equality follows from di⁄erentiating the value functions and exploiting the envelope conditions for
st and Rt, as in the derivation of (9) above.
















To write this expression in terms of the liquidity and moral hazard e⁄ects on search intensity, note
that the ￿rst order condition for s0 is:
PEV0(A0;a) ￿ PU0(A0;a;b) =  0(s0)
which is a simple generalization of (4), replacing the value function V with its expected value
and integrating over the wage distribution. Di⁄erentiating the ￿rst-order condition yields the
following comparative statics: @s0=@b = ￿P @U0
@b = 00(s0), @s0=@a = Pf@EV0
@a ￿ @U0




If the agent ￿nds a job in period 0, the average marginal utility of consumption (integrating over
the wage distribution) is @EV0
@wm = TEv0(ce
















To simplify this expression, make the approximation that the average marginal utility of consump-
tion is constant over time, i.e. Ev0(ce
0) = Ev0(ce
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which is precisely the same formula as in Corollary 1.
The problem in implementing (23) empirically is that the re-employment hazard in period t
is ht = st[1 ￿ F(Rt)]. Therefore changes in ht that are observed in the data cannot be directly
mapped to changes in st. To address this problem, note that the expected accepted wage is




Letting the density of the wage distribution be denoted by f(w), we have
@wt
@Rt




For any variable x 2 fa;bg, the e⁄ect of a change in x on the average accepted wage is
@wt
@x
























































This formula shows that one can calculate dW
db when wage o⁄ers are stochastic using information
about the reservation wage R0 and the e⁄ect of bene￿ts and cash grants on mean accepted wages.
If @xt
@A0 = 0 and @xt













which is exactly the formula implemented in section 5.
Extension 3: Heterogeneity. For simplicity, consider the baseline model with T = 1. Suppose
the economy has N individuals, indexed by i. Let ui, vi,  i, denote the consumption utility
42functions of agent i. Let Ai
0 denote initial assets and wi
0 denote the wage. The government￿ s
objective is to maximize the sum of the agent￿ s expected utilities subject to the constraint that
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1￿Es0 denote the elasticity of the average fraction of time spent unem-
ployed w.r.t. b0. This equation is analogous to (10), showing that the per-capita welfare gain from
increasing b0 can be expressed in terms of average marginal utilities when there is heterogeneity in
the population.
To relate this expression to liquidity and moral hazard e⁄ects, observe that the ratio of the

























If the heterogeneity in the population is such that v0
i(ce
0;i) ?  00(si
0) and u0
i(cu
















This expression coincides with (11), except that all the moments are replaced by population means.
An analogous independence assumption and derivation following the proof of Proposition 1 can be
used to extend this result to T > 1.
Bounding Argument for ￿. Assume r = ￿, so that the consumption path is ￿ at after re-
43employment. Taking a quadratic approximation to the utility function, some algebra yields the





t;j is the average level of consumption after re-employment, with
strict equality i⁄￿ = 0. Intuitively, ￿ depends on the di⁄erence in consumption if a new job is found










0;j, the agent￿ s wealth upon re-employment is lowered by the lost
income during the unemployment spell.
At an average unemployment duration of 18.3 weeks with a UI replacement rate of 50%, the
loss in wealth is 9:15w, where w is the weekly wage. Since consumption upon re-employment is





Xw where X is the total weeks of work remaining
after re-employment. In the SIPP data, the average age of the job losers is 37. Assuming a mean




0;j ￿ 0:992. Translating this value
into an estimate of ￿ requires an assumption about the curvature of the utility function. Under




0;j )￿. If ￿ = 2, a commonly
used value in the literature (Chetty 2006b), ￿ ￿ 0:015.
Appendix B: SIPP Sample and Variable De￿nitions
The data used in section 3 are from the 1985, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1996
panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP collected information
from a sample of approximately 13,000 households in 1985 that grew over time to over 36,000
households in 1996. Interviews were conducted every four months for a period of two to four years,
so the data span the beginning of 1985 to the middle of 2000.
Pooling the eight panels yield a universe of 468,766 individuals from 149,286 households. 99,880
of these individuals experience at least one job separation (as de￿ned below) during the sample
period. Further restricting the sample to individuals between the ages of 18 and 65 who have at
least three months of work history and have been included in the panel for at least three months
leaves 78,168 individuals. Because of a problematic de￿nition of unemployment status in the 1985
to 1987 versions of the SIPP, individuals sometimes report a job separation while also reporting
unemployment duration equal to zero. Rede￿ning unemployment status to only include those who
report becoming unemployed and also a non-zero unemployment duration leaves 65,135 individuals.
I drop observations from Maine, Vermont, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Alaska, Idaho,
Montana, and Wyoming because the SIPP does not provide unique state identi￿ers for individuals
residing in these small states. This leaves me with a sample of 62,598 individuals and 86,921
unemployment spells. 33,149 of these spells are for women, whom I exclude. I also keep only
those individuals who report actively searching for a job, as de￿ned below, to eliminate those who
have dropped out of the labor force. This leaves a sample of 16,784 individuals (3.6% of original
sample) who experienced a total of 21,796 unemployment spells. Next, I drop temporarily layo⁄s,
since these individuals may not have been actively searching for a new job, leaving 21,107 spells.
I then exclude individuals who never received UI bene￿ts, leaving 7,015 spells. Finally, I further
limit the sample to individuals who take up bene￿ts within the ￿rst month after job loss because it
is unclear how UI should a⁄ect hazards for individuals who delay takeup. This last step produces a
core sample consisting of 4,015 individuals (0.86% of the original sample) and 4,560 unemployment
spells, of which 4,337 have asset and mortgage information.
Measurement of unemployment durations. The measurement of unemployment dura-
tions in the SIPP di⁄ers from conventional measures because it requires the tabulation of responses
44to questions about employment at the weekly level. In particular, the SIPP reports the employment
status of every individual over 15 years old for every week that they are in the sample. Weekly
employment status (ES) can take the following values: 1. With a job this week; 2. With a job,
absent without pay, no time on layo⁄ this week; 3. With a job, absent without pay, spent time on
layo⁄ this week; 4. Looking for a job this week; 5. Without a job, not looking for a job, not on
layo⁄. A job separation is de￿ned as a change in ES from 1 or 2 to 3, 4, or 5. Following Cullen and
Gruber (2000), I compute the duration of unemployment by summing the number of consecutive
weeks that ES >= 3, starting at the date of job separation and stopping when the individual ￿nds
a job that lasts for at least one month (i.e., reports a string of four consecutive ES=1 or ES =2).
Individuals are de￿ned as being on temporary layo⁄if they report ES = 3 at any point in the spell.
They are de￿ned as ￿searching￿if they report ES = 4 at any point during their spell.
Prediction of Individual-Level Unemployment Bene￿ts. I estimate a ￿rst-stage equa-
tion for earnings using OLS on the full sample of individuals who report a job loss at some point
during the sample period. I regress nominal log wages in the year before job loss on years of
education, age at job loss, years of tenure on the last job, a dummy for left-censoring of this job
tenure variable, industry, occupation, month, and year dummies, and the unemployment rate in
the relevant state/year. Since many individuals in the sample do not have a full year￿ s earning￿ s
history before a job separation, I de￿ne the annual income of these individuals by assuming that
they earned the average wage they report before they began participating in the SIPP. For ex-
ample, individuals with one quarter of wage history are assumed to have an annual income of four
times that quarter￿ s income. Using the coe¢ cient estimates, I predict log wages for each job loser,
and recover the predicted wage in levels. I then use this predicted wage to simulate the claimant￿ s
unemployment bene￿t using the UI bene￿t calculator under the assumption that wages are constant
over the ￿base period￿(typically the ￿ve quarters before job loss).
Note that simulating bene￿ts using individuals￿actual reported wage histories rather than the
predicted wages yields a distribution of unemployment bene￿t levels that has much higher variance
and a much weaker correlation with durations in the full sample. The predicted wage measure
smooths the reported income ￿ uctuations by isolating permanent di⁄erences in income correlated
with stable characteristics such as education. Reassuringly, when the sample is restricted to
observations in which the deviation between the predicted wage and actual reported wage is small
(e.g. <25%), the point estimates for the speci￿cations in Table 2 obtained are similar to those
obtained in the full sample.
Appendix C: Mathematica Sample and Variable De￿nitions
The data for the analysis in section 5 from two surveys conducted by Mathematica on be-
half of the Department of Labor, matched with administrative data from state UI records. The
datasets are publicly available through the Upjohn Institute. The ￿rst dataset is the ￿Pennsylvania
Reemployment Bonus Demonstration,￿which contains information on 5,678 durations for a repre-
sentative sample of job losers in Pennsylvania in 1991. This dataset contains information on prior
wages, weeks of UI paid, as well as demographic characteristics, household income, job characteris-
tics (tenure, occupation, industry), and receipt of severance pay. The second dataset is the ￿Study
of Unemployment Insurance Exhaustees,￿which contains data on the unemployment durations of
3,907 individuals who claimed UI bene￿ts in 1998. This dataset is a sample of unemployment
durations in 25 states of the United States, with oversampling of individuals who exhausted UI
bene￿ts. The information in the dataset is similar to that in the Pennsylvania study. Combining
the two datasets yields a pooled sample contains 9,585 individuals. Note that Pennsylvania is not
included in the Exhaustees study, and hence there is only one year of data for each state in the
sample.
45For comparability, I make the same exclusions as in the SIPP. First, I include only prime-age
males, dropping 44.7% of original sample. Second, I exclude temporary layo⁄s by discarding all
individuals who expected a recall at the time of layo⁄, dropping an additional 24.8% of the original
sample. Finally, I drop all individuals with missing data either on severance payments, years of job
tenure, reported survey durations, or the variables used to predict net liquid wealth, losing another
5% of the original sample. These exclusions leave 2,441 individuals in the sample.
Consistent with the SIPP de￿nition, I measure unemployment durations as the number of weeks
elapsed from the end of the individual￿ s prior job to the start of his next job as reported on the
Mathematica survey.
Calculation of Mean Severance Amounts. Lee Hecht Harrison (2001) reports results from
a survey of severance pay policies of human resource executives at 925 corporations in the U.S. in
2001. At companies where the severance amount is based on years of service (which is the most
common practice), the report provides a tabulation of the number of weeks of severance provided
per week of service (see Table 1 in Section II, page 4). Using the percentages reported in this table
for ￿non-exempts￿(hourly workers) and coding the < 1 week category as 0.5 weeks, I compute
that on average, individuals receive 1.35 weeks of severance pay per year of service. Lee Hecht
Harrison reports that severance pay is typically capped at 26 weeks (6 months) for hourly workers.
De￿ning the severance amount for each individual as min(1:35￿ job tenure;26) I compute that the
average severance pay recipient in the Mathematica sample receives 7:77 ￿ 1:35 = 10:68 weeks of
wages in severance pay. The average severance pay amounts for the low-tenure and high-tenure
groups discussed in section 4 are calculated using analogous methods.
461 2 3 4
Pooled (< -$1,115) (-$1,115-$128) ($128-$13,430) (>$13,430)
Prior to or at job loss:
   Mean Annual Wage $20,711 $19,638 $15,971 $20,950 $26,726
   Median Annual Wage $17,780 $17,188 $14,346 $18,584 $23,866
   Age 37.0 35.5 35.2 36.7 41.7
   Years of Education 12.1 12.2 11.2 12.2 13.1
   Percent Married 61% 64% 59% 60% 63%
   Percent Spouse Working 37% 40% 28% 40% 44%
Post-layoff:
   Weekly indiv. unemp. benefits $166 $163 $152 $167 $184
   Indiv. replacement rate 49% 50% 50% 49% 47%
   Mean unemp. duration (weeks) 18.3 18.0 19.1 17.6 19.4
   Median unemp. duration 15.0 15.0 17.0 14.0 17.0
Assets and Liabilities:
   Mean Liq. Wealth $22,701 $1,536 $502 $5,898 $87,912
   Median Liq. Wealth $1,763 $466 $0 $4,273 $53,009
   Mean Unsecured Debt $3,964 $10,008 $697 $1,752 $3,171
   Median Unsecured Debt $960 $5,659 $0 $353 $835
   Mean Home Equity $31,053 $19,768 $12,866 $30,441 $62,663
   Median Home Equity $8,143 $2,510 $0 $11,794 $48,900
   Percent with Mortgage 45% 46% 27% 49% 59%
   Percent Renters 39% 43% 61% 35% 16%
NOTE--Table entries are means unless otherwise noted.  Data source is 1985-87, 1990-93, and 1996 SIPP panels.
Sample includes prime-age males who (a) report searching for a job, (b) are not on temporary layoff, (c) take
up UI benefits within one month of layoff, and (d) have at least 3 months of work history in the dataset.
Pooled sample size is 4,560 observations.  See Appendix B for further details on construction of sample.
Indiv. unemp. benefit is simulated individual-level benefit based on two stage procedure described in text.
Replacement rate is individual benefit divided by weekly pre-unemployment predicted wage.  Unemployment
duration is defined as time elapsed from end of last job to start of next job.  Asset and liability data is collected
once per panel, prior to job loss for approximately half the sample and after job loss for the remainder.
Liquid wealth is defined as total wealth minus home, business, and vehicle equity.
Net liquid wealth is liquid wealth minus unsecured debt.  All monetary values are in real 1990 dollars.
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics by Wealth Quartile for SIPP Sample
Net Liquid Wealth Quartile(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled Stratified Mortgage
Full cntrls No cntrls Avg WBA Max WBA Ind. WBA Full cntrls
log UI ben -0.527
(0.267)
Q1 x log UI ben -0.721 -0.978 -0.727 -0.642
(0.304) (0.398) (0.302) (0.241)
Q2 x log UI ben -0.699 -0.725 -0.388 -0.765
(0.484) (0.420) (0.303) (0.219)
Q3 x log UI ben -0.368 -0.476 -0.091 -0.561
(0.309) (0.358) (0.370) (0.156)
Q4 x log UI ben 0.234 0.103 0.304 0.016
(0.369) (0.470) (0.339) (0.259)
mortg x log UI ben -1.181
(0.491)
no mortg x log UI ben 0.079
(0.477)
log UI ben x spell wk. x
log UI ben x spell wk. x x x x x
int. with netliq or mortg
state, year, ind., occ. x x x x x
fixed effects
wage spline x
ind, occ interactions x x x x
with netliq or mortg
wage spline interaction x x x x
Q1=Q4 p-val 0.039 0.013 0.001 0.090
Q1+Q2=Q3+Q4 p-val 0.012 0.008 0.002 0.062
mortg = no mortg p-val 0.005
Number of Spells 4529 4337 4054 4054 4054 2052
TABLE 2
Effect of UI Benefits: Cox Hazard Model Estimates
Stratified with Full Controls
NOTE-Coefficients reported are elasticities of hazard rate w.r.t. UI bens.  Standard errors clustered by state in 
parentheses.  See note to Table 1 for sample definition.  Sample in column 6 includes those with pre-unemp. 
mortgage data.  Bottom rows of table report p-values from F-test for equality of reported coefficients across quartiles 
or mortgage groups.  Columns 2-6 are cox models stratified by net liquid wealth quartile or mortgage status.  All 
specifications except 2 include following additional controls: age, years of education, marital status, log total wealth, 
and a dummy for being on seam between interviews to adjust for "seam effect."  Columns 3-6 include in addition 
interactions of occupation+industry dummies and wage spline with stratification variable (netliq quartile or mortgage). 
All columns include time-varying interaction between log UI benefit and weeks elapsed of spell; in columns 2-6, this 
time-varying effect is interacted with the stratification variable. In columns 1-3 and 6, UI ben is defined as average UI 
benefit in claimant's state/year pair.Pooled No Severance Severance
(0.81) (0.19)
Prior to or at job loss:
   Mean annual wage $28,149 $26,213 $37,174
   Median annual wage $20,848 $19,347 $30,693
   Age 36.2 35.2 40.6
   Percent dropouts 14% 15% 6%
   Percent college grads 17% 13% 34%
   Percent married 58% 56% 68%
   Mean job tenure (years) 4.5 3.8 8.1
   Median job tenure (years) 1.9 1.5 4.8
Post-layoff:
   Weekly unemployment benefits $198 $190 $236
   Replacement Rate 49% 51% 43%
   Mean unemployment duration 24.3 24.0 25.6
   Median unemployment duration 20.0 20.0 22.0
   Mean compensated duration 15.8 15.3 18.2
   Median compensated duration 16.0 16.0 20.0
NOTE--Table entries are means unless otherwise noted. Data are from surveys of job losers 
conducted by Mathematica. Sample includes prime-age male UI claimants who are not on temporary 
layoff. Pooled sample size is 2,441 observations. See Appendix C for details.  Data is reweighted 
using sampling probabilities to yield estimates for a representative sample of job losers. Pre-unemp 
job tenure is number of years spent working at firm from which worker was laid off.  Weekly 
unemployment benefit is actual individual benefit based on UI records. Replacement rate is weekly 
benefit times 52 divided by annual wage.  Unemployment duration is time elapsed from end of last job 
to start of next job. Compensated duration is weeks of UI collected. All monetary values are in real 
1990 dollars.
TABLE 3
Summary Statistics by Severance Receipt for Mathematica Sample(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covariates:  Tenure Full Tenure Full Tenure Full
Severance Pay Dummy -0.179 -0.233
(0.050) (0.071)
(Netliq < Median) x Sev Pay -0.493 -0.457
(0.086) (0.099)
(Netliq > Median) x Sev Pay 0.030 -0.088
(0.058) (0.081)
(Tenure < Median) x Sev Pay -0.099 -0.143
(0.048) (0.055)
(Tenure > Median) x Sev Pay -0.253 -0.340
(0.084) (0.119)
tenure spline x x x
state, ind., occ. fixed effects x x x
wage spline x x x
ind., occ., wage-spline interact x x
with Netliq>Med or Tenure>Med
Equality of coeffs p-val <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.03
Number of spells 2441 2428 2441 2428 2441 2428
TABLE 4
Effect of Severance Pay: Cox Hazard Model Estimates
individual's job tenure is below 4.83 years (the median level tenure among severance pay recipients).  Ind. 
and occ. dummies and wage splines are interacted with the stratification variable in columns 4 and 6.
NOTE-Coefficients reported can be interpreted as percentage change in hazard rate associated with 
receipt of severance pay.  Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.  See note to Table 3 for 
sample definition.  Bottom row of specs 3-6 reports p-values from an F-test for equality of coefficients 
across low and high-asset or low and high-tenure groups.  All specifications include a sevpay x spell week 
interaction variable to capture time-varying effects of severance pay. Columns 1, 3, 5 include only a linear 
control for tenure at pre-job loss employer in addition.  Columns 2, 4, 6 include the following controls in 
addition to those listed in the table: age, marital status, dummies for dropout and college graduate, and log 
individual weekly UI benefit.  In specs. 3-4, baseline hazards are stratified by Netliq < Median.  Netliq < 
Median is an indicator variable for whether the household's predicted assets are below the sample 
median.  Assets are predicted using the SIPP data as described in text.  In specs 5-6, baseline hazards 
are stratified by Tenure < Median.  Tenure < Median is an indicator variable for whether the
Pooled By Wealth By Sev. Amt.Figure 1
UI Benefit and Liquidity Effects by Initial Assets


















































NOTE–This figure plots simulated values of period 0 search intensity (s0) for two agents, one with
A0 ￿ ￿$1000 and the other with A0 ￿ $13,000. Model is parametrized as follows:
utility u￿c￿ ￿ v￿c￿ ￿ c1￿￿
1￿￿ with ￿ ￿ 1.75; disutility of search ￿￿s￿ ￿ ￿ s1￿￿
1￿￿ for s ￿ 0.25;.￿￿s￿ ￿ ￿ for
s ￿ 0.25 with ￿ ￿ 0.1, ￿ ￿ 5; wage w ￿ $340 per week, asset limit L ￿ ￿$1000, T ￿ 500; UI benefit
bt ￿ b for t ￿ 25, bt ￿ 0 for t ￿ 25; annuity payment at ￿ 0.25w ￿ a for t ￿ 25 and at ￿ 0.25w for
t ￿ 25. Solid curves plot s0 as a function of UI benefit level b, ranging from b ￿ 0.05w ￿ $17 per week to
b ￿ 0.95w ￿ $323 per week, holding fixed a ￿ 0. Dashed curves plot s0 as a function of an increment in
the annuity over the first 26 weeks, holding fixed b ￿ 0.Figure 2





































































NOTE–This figure plots the marginal welfare gain of raising the UI benefit level, defined as the change in the
agent’s expected utility from raising b divided by the change in expected utility from raising the wage by $1 in
all periods. The solid curve shows the actual (numerically simulated) value of dW
db as a function of b. The
dashed curve shows the approximate value calculated using the formula in Corollary 1. The simulation




























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Lowest Quartile of Net Wealth
Figure 3a
Mean rep. rate = .53
Mean rep. rate = .48





























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Second Quartile of Net Wealth
Figure 3b
Mean rep. rate = .48
Mean rep. rate = .53
Wilcoxon Test for Equality: p = 0.04
NOTE–Sample for both figures consists of observations in the core SIPP sample for which pre-unemployment
wealth data are available. See Table 1 for definition of core sample and definition of net liquid wealth. Figure
3a includes households in lowest quartile of real net liquid wealth. Figure 3b includes those in second quartile.
Each figure plots Kaplan-Meier survival curves for two groups of individuals: those in state/year pairs with
average weekly benefit amounts (WBA) below the sample mean and those in state/year pairs with WBAs
above the mean. The mean replacement rate is the average individual-level predicted benefit divided by wage
for observations in the relevant group. Survival curves are adjusted for seam effect by fitting a Cox model with




























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Third Quartile of Net Wealth
Figure 3c
Mean rep. rate = .46
Mean rep. rate = .52





























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Highest Quartile of Net Wealth
Figure 3d
Mean rep. rate = .43
Mean rep. rate = .52
Wilcoxon Test for Equality: p = 0.43
NOTE–These figures are constructed in the same way as Figures 3a-b using observations in the third and




























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Households with Mortgages
Figure 4a
Wilcoxon Test for Equality: p = 0.01
Mean rep. rate = .52





























0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks Unemployed
Avg. UI benefit below mean Avg. UI benefit above mean
Effect of UI Benefits on Durations: Households without Mortgages
Figure 4b
Wilcoxon Test for Equality: p = 0.31
Mean rep. rate = .47
Mean rep. rate = .53
NOTE–These figures are constructed in the same way as Figures 3a-b; see notes to Figures 3a-b for
additional details. Figure 4a includes households who make mortgage payments; 4b includes all others. Only






























0 5 10 15 20
Weeks Unemployed
No Severance Received Severance
Effect of Severance Pay on Durations
Figure 5
NOTE–Data are from Mathematica surveys; see note to Table 3 for additional details on data and sample
definition. Data is reweighted using sampling probabilities to yield estimates for a representative sample of job
losers. Kaplan-Meier survival curves are plotted for two groups of individuals: Those who received a
severance payment at the time of job loss and those who did not. Survival curves are adjusted for the effect of
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Weeks Unemployed
No Severance Received Severance




























0 5 10 15 20
Weeks Unemployed
No Severance Received Severance
Effect of Severance Pay on Durations: Above Median Net Wealth
Figure 6b
NOTE–See Figure 5 for sample definition. Each of these figures is constructed in exactly the same way as
Figure 5. Figure 6a includes observations where predicted net wealth is below the sample median; Figure 6b
includes those above the median. Net wealth is predicted using a linear function of age, wage, education, and













































































NOTE–In this figure, the dW
db curves plot the welfare gain of raising the UI benefit b by $1 over the first 26
weeks as a function of the government loan amount. The dW
dG curves plot the welfare gain gain of raising the
government loan amount by $B ￿ $26 as a function of the loan amount. The solid curves are for a long-term
loan that must be repaid upon death; the dashed curves are for a two-year loan. All the welfare gains are
exact numerical simulations which assume A0 ￿ $100,b ￿ 0.5w,.and all other parameters as in Figure 1.